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I. Introduction
The issue of governmental separation of powers in the United States has
occupied the attention of political leaders and commentators alike since the
nation’s inception.1 Unanswered questions about how much authority each
branch of government possesses, and what methods each branch can wield
legally to check the powers of the other two, remains as much at the forefront
of political and legal controversy today as at the time of our founding.2 Each
attempt to resolve these questions produces effects that resound throughout
matters of national, state, and local policy.3

1
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 37, 59– 64 (2005); Sean
Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln 315 (2005); Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review 48, 58,
106 – 08 (2004). The quotation that is perhaps most often cited regarding separation of powers
in the United States comes from James Madison, urging the people of this newly born nation to
adopt the Constitution as their fundamental plan of government: “The accumulation of all powers
legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The
Federalist No. 47, at 232 (James Madison) in The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist
Papers (David Wootton ed., Hackett 2003).
2
See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Donald Trump’s Constitution of One, Nat’l Review (May 12,
2016), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/435296/donald-trump-constitution-end-separationpowers; Neil H. Buchanan, Separation of Powers Gives the President Power on Debt, N.Y. Times (Jan.
15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/13/proposing-the-unprecedented-toavoid-default/separation-of-powers-gives-the-president-power-on-debt; Tobias T. Gibson, Executive
Orders Give Trump Lots of Power, But There Are Limits, The Hill (Feb. 3, 2017, 11:22 PM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/317878-executive-orders-give-trump-lots-ofpower-but-there-are; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, NSA Spying Undermines Separation of Powers, USA
Today (Feb. 10, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/10/nsa-spyingsurveillance-congress-column/5340281/.

See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 Harv. L. Rev. 412, 461– 85 (2012); John D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of
Powers, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 532–70 (2015); Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward
a Unifying Theory of Separation of Powers, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 46–61 (2003). For a good look at
the historical context of these enduring questions and concerns, see John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1971–93 (1942).
3
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During the past nine years, more than three hundred jurisdictions across
the United States have established specialized diversionary courts aimed
exclusively at defendants who previously served in the Armed Forces.4 Known
as “Veterans Treatment Courts,” these unique entities offer the potentially lifechanging opportunity for certain eligible justice-involved veterans to undergo
a court-prescribed individualized course of rehabilitative treatment in lieu of
incarceration.5 Veterans Treatment Courts have sparked significant debate at
all levels of government, with policymakers and observers rightfully examining
and questioning every aspect of how these courts function.6 One of the most
contentious of these discussions focuses on the issue of separation of powers, with
interested parties grappling over the level of control each branch of government
should maintain over a Veterans Treatment Court’s operations.7
4
Rachel Martin, Hundreds of Veterans Treatment Courts See Success But More Are Needed,
NPR (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/03/507983947/special-courts-for-militaryveterans-gain-traction.

Tabatha Renz, Veterans Treatment Court: A Hand Up Rather Than Lock Up, 17 Rich. J.
L. & Pub. Int. 697, 698–700, 704–05 (2013); Alana Frederick, Comment, Veterans Treatment
Courts: Analysis and Recommendations, 38 L. & Psychol. Rev. 211, 212–20 (2013); see also Mark
A. McCormick-Goodhart, Leaving No Veteran Behind: Policies and Perspectives on Combat Trauma,
Veterans Courts, and the Rehabilitative Approach to Criminal Behavior, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 895,
906 –25 (2013). Typically, Veterans Treatment Courts use the phrase “justice-involved veteran” to
describe any veteran accepted into the court’s treatment program, preferring this term over the more
traditional criminal court designation of “defendant.” See generally Sean Clark & Jim McGuire,
PTSD and the Law: An Update, 22 PTSD Research Q. 1–3 (2011) (using this phrase in sentences
where a description of a conventional criminal court would use the word “defendant”). Out of
respect for this preference, this article will generally use the phrase “justice-involved veteran” when
referring to veterans accepted into Veterans Treatment Courts and the word “defendant” to describe
veterans in a more traditional criminal court setting.
5

Allison L. Jones, Veterans Treatment Courts: Do Status-Based Problem-Solving Courts Create
an Improper Privileged Class of Criminal Defendants?, 43 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 307, 309–10
(2014); see, e.g., Claudia Arno, Proportional Response: The Need for More—and More Standardized—
Veterans’ Courts, 48 U Mich. J. L. Reform 1039, 1040– 42 (2015); Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming
Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military Veterans in the Criminal Justice System, 7 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 563, 569–71 (2010); Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went Off To War”: Considering
Veterans Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 Nova L. Rev. 445, 450, 465–72 (2013). See generally
Tiffany Cartwright, “To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle”: The Recent Development of
Veterans Treatment Courts in America, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 295, 299–303 (2011) (providing
a brief overview of studies documenting psychological trauma and criminal behaviors observed in
veterans and common barriers to receiving care).
6

7
See, e.g., Sohil Shah, Authorization Required: Veterans Treatment Courts, The Need for
Democratic Legitimacy, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 67, 67– 68,
105–06 (2014). This issue regarding separation of powers in a unique judicial environment
extends beyond Veterans Treatment Courts to encompass ongoing debates regarding “problemsolving courts,” including Drug Treatment Courts and Mental Health Courts, as a whole. See The
State and Federal Courts: A Complete Guide to History, Powers, and Controversy 292–93
(Christopher P. Banks ed., 2017); Dale Cathell, Wading Through The Swamp: The Memoirs
of a Bad Boy 276 (2014); Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving
Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1459, 1500–01 (2004); Benton
Smith, Twin Falls County to Open Problem Solving Court for Veterans, MagicValley (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://magicvalley.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/twin-falls-county-to-open-problem-solving-
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Plenty of judges who preside over Veterans Treatment Courts argue their
courtrooms should remain largely free from control by the other branches of
government, permitting these courts the independence necessary to operate
freely at the local level.8 However, standardization of Veterans Treatment Court
processes could undermine the individualized treatment and rehabilitation
objectives for which these courts were created. This could force judges and other
court personnel to take actions that are not in the best interest of the justiceinvolved veteran, the court itself, or the general public.9 On the other hand,
several states have enacted legislation governing multiple aspects of Veterans
Treatment Courts within their borders, thereby guaranteeing substantial
involvement of the legislative and executive branches in the functioning of these
tribunals.10 In the judgment of these legislative and executive branch leaders,
proper oversight and implementation of Veterans Treatment Courts should
necessitate at least a baseline set of evenly applied standards that are codified in
the law, ensuring the label of “Veterans Treatment Court” carries with it certain
fundamental criteria.11
This article proposes a middle ground amid this enduring dispute. To
describe and justify this concept of a more balanced approach to administering
Veterans Treatment Courts, the article proceeds in five parts. Part II summarizes
the development, evolution, and impacts of Veterans Treatment Courts, including
a brief discussion about the commonly accepted vital components of the basic
Veterans Treatment Court model.12 Part III reviews the overall legacy and
importance of judicial autonomy in the United States and examines key rationales
for legislative and executive intervention in matters of judicial process.13 Part IV
court-for-veterans/article_cec66007-e025-5af3-b332-ecb929b912fe.html; Kristina Shevory, Why
Veterans Should Get Their Own Courts, The Atlantic (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2011/12/why-veterans-should-get-their-own-courts/308716/.
See Shah, supra note 7, at 81–82. In addition, several Veterans Treatment Courts expressed
this viewpoint in conversations held “on background” with the author.
8

See, e.g., William E. Rafferty, Despite Being Vetoed Three Times, California Legislature Debates
Bill Regarding Creation of Veterans Courts, Gavel To Gavel (Mar. 5, 2015), http://gaveltogavel.
us/2015/03/05/despite-being-vetoed-3-times-california-legislature-debates-bill-regarding-creationof-veterans-courts/. For example, this was the opinion of California governors who vetoed three
bills that proposed methods of standardizing Veterans Treatment Court processes. Id.
9

10
Justice For Vets, Veterans Treatment Court State Legislation, http://justiceforvets.org/statelegislation (last visited Dec. 14, 2016); William E. Rafferty, Veterans Courts: 2013 Legislatures Are
Both Encouraging Them and Trying to Give the Executive Control Over Them, Gavel To Gavel (Feb. 26,
2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2013/02/26/veterans-courts-2013-legislatures-are-both-encouragingthem-and-trying-to-give-the-executive-control-over-them/?doing_wp_cron=1484591792.
3289239406585693359375.
11
See Arno, supra note 6, at 1069–70. For further discussion about the specific criteria
established in several state Veterans Treatment Court statutes, see infra notes 232–394 and
accompanying text; see also Jones, supra note 6, at 310 (discussing a lack of uniformity and
standardization as one of the most problematic shortcomings of Veterans Treatment Courts).
12

See infra notes 17–92 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.
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utilizes the information provided in the previous two sections to demonstrate
that at least some statutorily-developed standards governing Veterans Treatment
Courts are allowable from a separation of powers perspective and beneficial from
a public policy perspective.14 Part V compares and contrasts several existing state
statutes regarding Veterans Treatment Courts, with an emphasis on studying the
common elements shared among laws.15 Lastly, Part VI offers a framework that
strikes a balance between judicial autonomy and statutory oversight, establishing
a steadier balance by demanding a bedrock legal framework while still leaving
significant discretion to the individual courts to administer as they deem fit.16

II. Veterans Treatment Courts: Balancing Individual
Treatment with Societal Justice
It started with an unpleasant day in court.17 Judge Robert Russell had
encountered a particularly difficult defendant in the Drug Treatment Court
over which he presided in Buffalo, New York.18 The man was not belligerent,
but simply seemed unreachable.19 Any questions from the judge regarding
his progress through drug counseling and treatment were met with shrugs and
vacant stares.20
Exasperated, Judge Russell asked two members of the Drug Court team to
speak with the defendant outside of the courtroom.21 Twenty minutes later, the

14

See infra notes 154–230 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 395–455 and accompanying text.

Ari Melber, For Vets, Rehab Rather Than Prison, MSNBC (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.
msnbc.com/the-cycle/vets-rehab-rather-prison.
17

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

Chris Peak, All it Took Was One Judge and Two Veterans to Provide Another Chance to Countless
Soldiers, NAVSO (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.navso.org/news/all-it-took-was-one-judge-and-twoveterans-provide-another-chance-countless-soldiers. The verbiage of this headline contains the type
of mistake that is common to commentators who lack the necessary military cultural competency,
including plenty of judges who preside over traditional criminal courts. See, e.g., William B. Brown
et al., The Perfect Storm: Veterans, Culture, and the Criminal Justice System, 10 Justice Pol’y J. 1,
23–24 (2013). In military parlance, the word “Soldiers” refers only to members of the United States
Army. Alexandria Neason, Is There Such a Thing as One Troop?, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2010/08/13/129183352/is-there-such-a-thing-as-onetroop. Veterans Treatment Courts, however, also assist plenty of Sailors (Navy), Airmen (Air Force),
Marines, and Guardsmen (Coast Guard). See id. (discussing the proper usage of these military labels
and the sensitivities surrounding the improper use of these terms); Lindsey Getz, Veterans Treatment
Courts—Helping Vets Seek Justice, Social Work Today, http://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/
SO17p22.shtml (noting that these courts assist servicemembers from multiple branches, not
exclusively Army soldiers).
21
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trio re-entered.22 This time, the man stood straight and tall before the judge,
hands clasped behind his back in a posture the military labels “parade rest.”23
Locking eyes with Judge Russell, the man uttered the words that the judge never
thought he would hear: “Judge, I’m going to try harder.”24
Pleased but bewildered, Judge Russell caught up with the two Drug Court
team members as soon as the day’s session had adjourned and asked how they
had transformed the defendant’s attitude so quickly.25 The Drug Court team
members explained that the defendant was a veteran who had served in combat
in Vietnam.26 Since both of them were also veterans, they engaged the man in a
conversation about their shared military experiences and about the struggles of
readjusting to civilian life.27 That brief conversation was enough for the defendant
to understand he had individuals around him who shared the comradeship of
military service and who would fight alongside him on his road to recovery.28
Today, commentators widely recognize this day in 2008 as the birth of a
new courtroom model for certain veterans in the criminal justice system.29 Four
years earlier, in Anchorage, Alaska, Judge Sigurd E. Murphy, a retired Brigadier
General of the United States Army, had established a specialized “therapeutic
court” exclusively for veterans with retired Air Force Colonel Jack W. Smith.30
Like the Buffalo model, the Alaska court offered a veteran-to-veteran mentor
program and significant integration with services provided by the United States
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).31 Yet it was Judge Russell’s experience in
Buffalo that truly placed this concept on the radar of public consciousness.32

22

Peak, supra note 21.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

Bernard Edelman, VVA & Veterans Treatment Courts, The VVA Veteran (Mar./Apr. 2015),
http://vvaveteran.org/35-2/35-2_vetcourts.html.
26

27

See id.

28

See id.

Matthew Daneman, N.Y. Court Gives Veterans Chance to Straighten Out, USA Today
(June 1, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-06-01-veterans-court_N.htm
(stating that both the United States Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Drug Court
Institute recognize Judge Russell’s court as the nation’s first Veterans Treatment Court); Neale Gulley,
Nation’s First Veterans Court Counts Its Successes, Reuters (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-court-veterans-idUSTRE7082U020110109; J.P. Lawrence, Veterans Treatment Courts,
Explained, San Antonio Express-News (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.expressnews.com/militarycity/
article/Veterans-treatment-courts-explained-9447254.php.
29

Jack W. Smith, The Anchorage, Alaska Veterans Court and Recidivism: July 6, 2004—Dec.
31, 2010, 29 Alaska L. Rev. 93, 93–98, 100–02 (2012).
30

31

Id.

32

Hawkins, supra note 6, at 566.
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As a non-veteran, the effectiveness of a mere twenty-minute discussion
among three former servicemembers who were willing to support one another
astonished Judge Russell.33 That afternoon, he began developing a plan with the
two veterans from his Drug Court team.34 They decided to set aside one day
each week exclusively for ex-military members and assemble a group with the
proper level of cultural competency to address veteran defendants as peers.35 The
cultural competency of the group would help gain the trust and understanding of
the veterans and link them with veteran-specific benefits and services.36
Significant media attention soon followed.37 When other jurisdictions learned
of what Judge Russell had done in Buffalo, several decided to develop a similar
model in their own courtrooms.38 Early results demonstrated the successful
outcome of veterans graduating from their court-assigned courses of treatment,
returning to free society as rehabilitated individuals rather than serving lengthy
and expensive sentences behind bars, and rarely committing another criminal
offense.39 When other jurisdictions saw the impact of these increasingly wellpublicized positive outcomes, the concept spread even faster.40
Today, more than three hundred Veterans Treatment Courts exist nationwide,
with the majority of states maintaining at least one such court within their
borders.41 More than ten thousand justice-involved veterans have passed through
33
Edelman, supra note 26 (“‘You mean to tell me this guy, being in counseling, they can’t
make any headway? And talking to a couple of vets, he responds like that?’ The judge was astonished.
And intrigued.”).
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

See Peak, supra note 21.

See, e.g., Cheryl Conley, Judge: Keep Vets Out of Jail, NPR (June 18, 2008), http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=91633166; Carolyn Thompson, Special Court for Veterans
Addresses More Than Crime, Boston Globe (July 7, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/
articles/2008/07/07/special_court_for_veterans_addresses_more_than_crime/?camp=pm;
Daneman, supra note 29.
37

See Jack Leonard, Court Program Offers a More Rehabilitative Way of Handling Veterans, L.A.
Times (Sept. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/14/local/la-me-veterans-20100914.
Between January 2008 and September 2010, forty-one additional jurisdictions opened a Veterans
Treatment Court. Id.
38

39

See, e.g., Conley, supra note 37; Daneman, supra note 29.

See Leonard, supra note 38; Gulley, supra note 29. By the midpoint of 2011, Judge Russell’s
court reported that 115 veterans had graduated from the court’s treatment program, with none
of them committing any subsequent crimes. Renz, supra note 5, at 699. As of June 30, 2014,
220 Veterans Treatment Courts existed throughout the United States. Justice For Vets, The
History, http://justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited Dec. 14, 2016). That number rose to more
than 300 by November 2016. Charlie Shelton, Veteran Treatment Courts Help Vets Stay on Their
Feet, American Homefront Project (Nov. 2, 2016), http://americanhomefront.wunc.org/post/
veteran-treatment-courts-help-vets-stay-their-feet.
40

41

Renz, supra note 5, at 699.
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Veterans Treatment Courts, with the vast majority of them returning to their
communities with a new commitment to completing their life’s mission in a
positive, productive, and law-abiding manner.42 National Veterans Treatment
Court conferences now attract tremendous numbers of judges, court coordinators,
social workers, peer mentors, and other individuals involved in the process of
administering these courts.43
The basic Veterans Treatment Court model follows the standard Drug
Treatment Court framework that has existed throughout the United States, with
increasing popularity, since 1989.44 Like a Drug Court, Veterans Treatment Courts
offer eligible individuals an opportunity to complete an individualized multi-step
treatment program developed by a team of experts and assigned by the presiding
judge as an alternative to incarceration.45 The court assigns each participant a
mentor to help guide him or her through the entire treatment process, in addition
to providing support from alcohol and substance abuse specialists, social workers,
employment counselors, and other professionals.46 Unlike a traditional court
setting, the prosecutor and defense attorney interact in a non-adversarial manner,
with the judge typically working with the justice-involved veteran in a manner
that is considerably less formal than in a criminal proceeding.47 Court appearances
See Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts, 31 Touro L. Rev. 385, 397 (2015);
Laurie A. Drapela, Clark County Veterans Treatment Court: Final Report and Program
Recommendations, Wash. State Univ. 16–18 (Oct. 2014), http://www.clark.wa.gov/sites/all/files/
district-court/Specialty%20Courts/2014VTCFinal.pdf; Ines Novacic, For Veterans in Legal Trouble,
Special Courts Can Help, CNN (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/for-veterans-legaltrouble-special-courts-can-help/; Melissa Fitzgerald, A Tale of Two Brothers, Huffington Post (Nov.
11, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-fitzgerald/a-tale-of-two-brothers_b_6135760.
html; Arno, supra note 6, at 1050; Jones, supra note 6, at 314; Perlin, supra note 6, at 450; cf.
Heath Druzin, Having Veterans As Mentors is Key to Treatment Court Success Stories, Stars &
Stripes (July 29, 2015), http://www.stripes.com/having-veterans-as-mentors-is-key-to-treatmentcourt-success-stories-1.360274. In Michigan alone, 222 of the 350 veterans referred to the state’s
Veterans Treatment Courts have successfully graduated from the program as of August 2016. Jeffrey
Cunningham, Veterans Court Aims to Restore Honor to Veterans Who Run Afoul of the Law, MI Live
(Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.mlive.com/jenison/index.ssf/2016/08/ottawa_county_courts.html.
42

43
See Vet Court Con to Make Historic Debut in Washington, D.C., All Rise 2–5 (Fall 2013)
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/AllRise_Fall2013.pdf.

N.Y. Bar Ass’n, Veterans Treatment Court Mentor Program Handbook 4, http://
www.nysba.org/VetsMentorProgram/; Ryan S. King & Jill Pasquarella, The Sentencing Project,
Drug Courts: A Review of the Evidence 1–2 (2009); Diana Moga, 9 Questions With a Veterans
Treatment Court Judge, Task & Purpose (July 11, 2016), http://taskandpurpose.com/9-questionsveteran-treatment-court-judge/; Hawkins, supra note 6, at 564.
44

Julie Marie Baldwin, Investigating the Programmatic Attack: A National Survey of Veterans
Treatment Courts, 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 705, 706–07 (2016); Cartwright, supra note 6,
at 303–07.
45

46

Arno, supra note 6, at 1048; Hawkins, supra note 6, at 565.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at
the Roanoke Veterans Treatment Court Program (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-roanoke-veterans-treatment-court-program
[hereinafter Holder Remarks].
47
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are frequent, with each treatment team member delivering reports about the
veteran’s progress and the justice-involved veteran answering directly to the judge
about his or her development in the steps toward graduation.48 Sobriety throughout
the process is expected, with justice-involved veterans receiving numerous
randomly administered drug and alcohol tests.49 Failure to finish each step in the
program to the satisfaction of the presiding judge and the treatment court team
can lead to the veteran’s removal from the Veterans Treatment Court system.50
This results in the veteran receiving more severe sanctions, possibly up to and
including incarceration.51
Where a Veterans Treatment Court differs from a traditional Drug
Treatment Court, however, is in the tribunal’s substantive emphasis on key aspects
of military culture.52 As one commentator aptly described this unique courtroom situation, “[t]he Veterans Treatment Court is the military unit: the judge
becomes the Commanding Officer, the volunteer veteran mentors become fire team
leaders, the court team becomes the company staff, and the veteran defendants
become the troops.”53 All of the mentors in Veterans Treatment Courts are
veterans themselves, and judges typically try to connect justice-involved veterans
with mentors from their same branch and era of military service.54 Additionally,
the other members of the treatment team in a Veterans Treatment Court team are
expected to possess a higher-than-average level of military cultural competency,
empowering the team to recognize underlying military-related issues that could
contribute to a veteran committing a crime—including, but not limited to,
service-connected Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Traumatic Brain Injury, or
military sexual trauma—and knowing how to effectively address such conditions
for veterans.55
Veterans Treatment Courts also serve as “one-stop shops,” linking justiceinvolved veterans with the full spectrum of federal, state, and local benefits and

Nat’l Inst. of Corrections, Veterans Treatment Court Resources, http://nicic.gov/justiceinvolved-veterans (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (stating that best practices require bi-weekly court
appearances for a justice-involved veteran beginning his or her treatment program).
48

Justice For Vets, What is a Veterans Treatment Court?, http://www.justiceforvets.org/whatis-a-veterans-treatment-court (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
49

Smith, supra note 30, at 100; see also infra notes 232–394 and accompanying text
(providing examples of state statutes defining the penalties for failure to complete the assigned
Veterans Treatment Court program).
50

51

Jones, supra note 6, at 314; Hawkins, supra note 6, at 566; Smith, supra note 30, at 100.

52

See, e.g., Arno, supra note 6, at 1048.

53

Justice For Vets, supra note 49.

54

Arno, supra note 6, at 1048–49.

See Jones, supra note 6, at 314–15 (describing this enhanced military cultural competency
as one of the most important policy rationales for establishing a Veterans Treatment Court).
55
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services earned as a result of their military service.56 Given the high percentage of
veterans who are unaware of these potentially life-changing services, or unable to
properly navigate the bureaucratic processes involved in obtaining these benefits,
establishing such connections is one of the most important rehabilitative roles a
Veterans Treatment Court performs.57 Representatives from the VA, particularly
Veterans Justice Outreach Specialists, play an active specialized assistance role
on most treatment teams.58 State and local Veterans Service Organizations commonly serve key functions in connecting justice-involved veterans with veteranspecific benefits, programs, and services59 As a result of this specialized assistance,
veterans may be able to obtain financial compensation for injuries incurred while
serving in the military, healthcare at VA medical facilities for a low cost or even
no cost, education at a university or vocational school with a low price tag or no
price tag at all, vocational rehabilitation training to develop skills for certain forms
of employment, and other similarly crucial forms of assistance.60
However, while the components described above are common to most
Veterans Treatment Courts, the procedures utilized in these courts are hardly
uniform.61 Instead, key differences in administration exist from jurisdiction

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Over $4 Million in
Grants to Rehabilitate and Reduce Recidivism Among Military Veterans (Sept. 20, 2016), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-over-4-million-grants-rehabilitate-andreduce-recidivism-among; Novacic, supra note 42.
56

57
See Jeanne Shaheen, Treatment, Not Jail, For Our Veterans, Fox News (Nov. 9, 2015),
http:// www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/11/09/treatment-not-jail-for-our-veterans.html.

Kierra Zoellick, The Role of Veterans Justice Outreach Specialists in Veterans Treatment Courts,
Am. U. School of Public Affairs (2016), http://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/videos/upload/TheRole-of-Veterans-Justice-Outreach-Specialists-in-VTCs-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
58

59
See, e.g., Michael C. McDaniel, Veterans Treatment Courts in Michigan: A Consideration of
the Factors for Success, Mich. Bar J. 18, 19 (Feb. 2015); Matt Steiner, Veterans Service Organizations
in Veterans Treatment Courts: Coming to the Aid of their Fellow Veterans, Justice For Vets 2–3
(May 2012), http://www.justiceforvets.org/sites/default/files/files/Veterans%20Service%20
Organizations%20in%20Veterans%20Treatment%20Courts.pdf.

Title 38 of the United States Code is filled with statutes governing benefits, programs, and
services for veterans who provided active duty military service and were discharged under conditions
other than dishonorable. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012). For example, veterans who incurred a
disability while in military service or had a disability exacerbated by such service are eligible for
tax-free disability compensation payments from the VA. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012); 38 C.F.R.
§ 4.19 (2017). Low-income veterans who served during a wartime period may be eligible for a
monthly tax-free VA pension. See Benjamin Pomerance, Fighting On Too Many Fronts: Concerns
Facing Elderly Veterans in Navigating the United States Department of Veterans Affairs Benefits System,
37 Hamline L. Rev. 19, 26–31 (2014). Veterans seeking to pursue education at a college, university,
or vocational program can receive substantial financial assistance to defray the costs of tuition, books
and supplies, and housing through the G.I. Bill. See Cassandria Dortch, The Post-9/11 Veterans
Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 G.I. Bill): Primer and Issues, Cong. Research Serv.,
8–14 (Sept. 13, 2017), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42755.pdf. This is just the tip of the iceberg of
possible benefits, programs, and services that could be available to a given veteran.
60

61

Jones, supra note 6, at 310.
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to jurisdiction.62 For example, some Veterans Treatment Courts will accept
only those veterans who received an honorable discharge from military service
because the VA excludes veterans with lower forms of discharge from most of
their benefits, programs, and services.63 Other Veterans Treatment Courts do not
automatically bar veterans with a lower character of discharge.64 Certain courts
demand the veteran demonstrate a nexus between his or her criminal offense
and his or her experiences in the military, while other courts impose no such
requirement.65 Some Veterans Treatment Courts will not accept individuals
whose lone form of military service occurred in the National Guard, while others
will consider any individual who ever wore the uniform of any component of
the Armed Forces.66 Some will admit only combat veterans, while others allow
veterans with either combat or non-combat service.67
Similar disparities exist regarding the types of cases a Veterans Treatment
Court will agree to hear.68 While these courts unvaryingly exclude the most
heinous crimes such as homicide, rape, kidnapping, crimes of terrorism, and
other comparably egregious offenses, significant variances emerge among
Veterans Treatment Courts in addressing other types of criminal charges.69
For instance, some Veterans Treatment Courts will accept veterans charged
with domestic violence crimes, while others establish an absolute bar to taking
domestic violence cases.70 Certain Veterans Treatment Courts will take cases of
“simple assault,” such as a commonplace bar fight in which the justice-involved
62
See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 722–33; see generally Arno, supra note 6, at 1060–61; Jones,
supra note 6, at 310; Perlin, supra note 6, at 457–59.
63
Cartwright, supra note 6, at 306; Moga, supra note 44. A veteran must possess a discharge
from active duty service under conditions that are “other than dishonorable” to be eligible for VA
benefits and services. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).
64

Moga, supra note 44.

Jones, supra note 6, at 309; Carly Everett, Cook County’s Effort to Provide a Veterans Track
Within the Domestic Violence Court for Chicago, 16 Dialogue 3 (2013), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/newsletter/publications/dialogue_home/dialogue_archive/ls_dial_wi13_lamp1.html.
65

66

See infra notes 232–395 and accompanying text.

Arno, supra note 6, at 1060 – 61; see Charles Davis, Traumatized Vets Are Finding Hope in
Special Courts, TakePart (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/feature/2015/03/06/veteranstreatment-courts.
67

Jeffrey Lewis Wieand, Jr., Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and Attorneys Can
Improve Their Handling of Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts, 19 Wash. & Lee J. Civ.
Rights & Soc. Just. 227, 247 (2012).
68

See Megan McCloskey, Veterans Court Takes a Chance on Violent Offenders, Stars & Stripes
(Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.stripes.com/veterans-court-takes-a-chance-on-violent-offenders1.118182; William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front: Special Courts Turn to Vets to Help
Other Vets, Am. Bar Ass’n J. (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_
battle_on_the_home_front_special_courts_turn_to_vets_to_help_other_vets/.; Arno, supra note 6,
at 1061; Baldwin, supra note 45, at 723; Perlin, supra note 6, at 458.
69

Pamela Kravetz, Way Off Base: An Argument Against Intimate Partner Violence Cases in
Veterans Treatment Courts, 4 Veterans L. Rev. 162, 165– 66 (2012); McMichael, supra note 69.
70
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veteran never used a weapon to attack the victim, while other courts decline
such matters.71 Illegal possession of firearms, an unsurprisingly common charge
for individuals who spent years under strict orders to keep their weapons close
at hand, is another problematic offense, with some Veterans Treatment Courts
rejecting these cases outright but others agreeing to consider accepting them on
a case-by-case basis.72 Some Veterans Treatment Courts refuse all cases in which
the veteran engaged in any form of violence or the threat of violence, while
others frequently accept offenders charged with a crime involving violence.73
Still another common difference appears in the relationship between the
presiding judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney in the Veterans Treatment
Court setting.74 While Veterans Treatment Courts are meant to be uniquely nonadversarial entities, the issue of whether a Veterans Treatment Court will accept a
particular individual can become very adversarial.75 The question of who should
serve as the “gatekeeper” for these courts, wielding the final decision of what
cases are admitted and what cases are denied, varies among the jurisdictions.76
Some courts grant final authority to the presiding judge, others permit the
District Attorney’s Office to have absolute veto power, and still others provide
for a collaborative conference between the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense
counsel.77 When a Veterans Treatment Court agrees to handle a case, the respective
Kravetz, supra note 70, at 183–84 n.109; see Jeanette Steele, Progress Report: Veterans Court,
San Diego Union-Tribune (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/military/sdutveterans-treatment-court-sandiego-permanent-2015jan11-htmlstory.html; Cartwright, supra note
6, at 309.
71

72
Kravetz, supra note 70, at 183– 84 n.109; see also Matthew Wolfe, From PTSD to Prison:
Why Veterans Become Criminals, The Daily Beast (July 28, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/28/from-ptsd-to-prison-why-veterans-become-criminals.html
(noting that keeping a firearm close at hand, a requirement while serving on active duty, morphs
into a potential felony charge immediately after a veteran’s discharge from military service).
73
Perlin, supra note 6, at 458; Wieand, supra note 68. Compare McMichael, supra note 69
(discussing a Veterans Treatment Court that tries to distinguish between those veterans who were
violent before military service and those whose violence began only after military service), and
McCloskey, supra note 69 (describing a specific Veterans Treatment Court in California that accepts
violent offenders), with Arno, supra note 6, at 1061 (stating that the Veterans Treatment Court in
Buffalo, New York, is limited to non-violent offenders).
74
New York State Veterans Treatment Court, Roundtable Discussion at the VA Medical
Center in Canandaigua, N.Y. (Nov. 18, 2015) (notes on file with the author) [hereinafter Veterans
Treatment Court Roundtable].
75
See id; see also Shah, supra note 7, at 95 (discussing multiple variances in the eligibility
requirements for Veterans Treatment Courts within the State of Wisconsin).
76

See infra notes 190–201 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Alabama Bar Ass’n, Core Competencies Guide: Veterans Treatment Court
Planning Initiative Trainings 1, 11, http://www.alabar.org/assets/uploads/2014/11/Veterans-CourtTeam-Members-Core-Competence-Guide-VTCPIT.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (stating that
the prosecutor typically serves as the gatekeeper for a Veterans Treatment Court in Alabama);
Michael C.H. McDaniel, Western Michigan University, Veterans Treatment Courts in
Michigan: A Manual for Judges 9–10 (2015), http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/admin/op/
77
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roles of these three key individuals in the ensuing treatment process likewise
differs tremendously from court to court.78
Data collection also remains disparate among the various courts.79 In a number
of jurisdictions, Veterans Treatment Courts are not required to develop reliable
methods of monitoring court activities, collect relevant data, or report this data in
a publicly accessible format.80 Some jurisdictions do institute data collection and
reporting demands, while other individual courts simply take it upon themselves
to engage in such a process.81 Still, the overall lack of objective and reliable data
regarding Veterans Treatment Courts remains startling and detrimental to the
public’s overall understanding of the benefits and drawbacks of these courts.82
Lastly, Veterans Treatment Courts differ in their criteria for graduation
from the treatment program and in the effects of this successful graduation.83
Some courts insist that a justice-involved veteran participate in the treatment
program for a particular amount of time before the veteran can become eligible to
problem-solving-courts/SiteAnalyticsReports/VTC%20Manual%20for%20Judges.pdf (describing
various gatekeeper models employed in Michigan’s Veterans Treatment Courts, including leaving
the decision up to the presiding judge and following a consensus model in which the prosecutor,
defense counsel, and judge all have a vote).
Veterans Treatment Court Roundtable, supra note 74 (noting the substantial variance
in handling Veterans Treatment Court cases from county to county, including differing types of
working relationships among judges, district attorneys, and defense attorneys). Veterans Treatment
Courts also differ significantly regarding the point at which they determine that a particular
defendant is a veteran who may be eligible for Veterans Treatment Court. See Baldwin, supra note
45, at 734 (stating 88% of all Veterans Treatment Courts surveyed lacked an established procedure
for identifying veterans in contact with the criminal justice system).
78

79

See Arno, supra note 6, at 1061, 1065– 68.

See, e.g., Kerwin Henderson & Kevin Stewart, Veterans Treatment Courts, AM. U. Just.
Programs Off. 2, https://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/initiatives/drug-court/upload/VTC-FactSheet.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2016); John Adams, Jaye Hobart & Mark Rosenberg, The Illinois
Veterans Treatment Court Mandate: From Concept to Success, The Simon Rev. Paper No. 48, 12 (Oct.
2016) (urging the State of Illinois to adopt reliable and consistent data collection methods among
its Veterans Treatment Courts to measure successes and failures and determine best practices).
80

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1210 (2017) (requiring Veterans Treatment Courts to
collect data “on each individual applicant and participant and the entire program.”).
81

Luciana Herman, Do Veterans Treatment Courts Make a Difference?, Stan. L. & Pol’y
Lab (Oct. 20, 2015), http://law.stanford.edu/2015/10/20/do-veterans-treatment-courts-makea-difference/ (“[N]o data exists on whether the outcomes from [Veterans Treatment Courts]
differ from one jurisdiction to another—each with its own rules and standards—or from other
regular courts. . . . Th[is] gap in knowledge impacts public policy as well as the lives of individual
veterans and their families and communities.”); Henderson & Stewart, supra note 80 (discussing
the problems created when jurisdictions fail to collect meaningful data regarding their Veterans
Treatment Courts). Thankfully, some researchers have recently published evidence-based reviews
of Veterans Treatment Courts across multiple jurisdictions, providing essential guidance for current
and future judges, attorneys, court personnel, social services leaders, and policymakers. See, e.g.,
Baldwin, supra note 45.
82

83

Baldwin, supra note 45, at 744–45.
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graduate, while others do not establish any time requirements.84 A number of
courts demand an evaluation from the treatment team affirming that the veteran’s
condition has improved, while others do not require such an assessment.85
Graduation from Veterans Treatment Court can result in full dismissal of the
charges against the justice-involved veteran, withdrawal of a guilty plea but
acceptance of a non-criminal disposition, or maintenance of the guilty plea with
a conviction of a less-severe offense, depending on the court.86 Here, as with the
other examples provided above, Veterans Treatment Courts institute distinct
procedures and deliver different outcomes from location to location.87
As a problem-solving and rehabilitation-centered model, Veterans Treatment Courts rightfully appear to be here to stay. Veterans Treatment Courts
stand as the latest chapter in the ongoing and necessary trend toward creative
judicial diversion programs, such as Drug Courts and Mental Health Courts,
in the criminal justice system.88 Anecdotally, the outcomes of these courts are
excellent overall, drawing support from both sides of the political aisle.89 In an
era of overcrowded prisons, high publicly-borne incarceration costs, better-thanever scientific knowledge about the physical and mental effects of military
service, and the challenges veterans can face in reintegrating into the civilian
world, and perhaps, more veteran-specific services available than at any other
point in the history of the United States, the Veterans Treatment Court concept
offers a sensible and rational approach to this area of criminal justice.90

84
See, e.g., Fifth Judicial District (Idaho), Veterans Treatment Court Participant
Handbook 2 (2015), http://www.5thjudicialdistrict.com/wp-content/uploads/problem-solvingcourt/family-reunification-drug-court/2015-5th-District-Vet-Court-handbook.pdf; Guadalupe
County Tex., Veterans Treatment Court Participant’s Handbook 4 (2016), http://www.
co.guadalupe.tx.us/vetcourt/pdfs/handbook.pdf; Forrest & Perry County Miss., Veteran’s
Treatment Court Participant Handbook 2, http://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/2956/
Participant%20Handbook_Forrest%20and%20Perry%20Counties%20Veterans%20
Treatment%20Court%20Mississippi.pdf?sequence=3 (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
85

Baldwin, supra note 45, at 744.

See infra notes 154–230 and accompanying text; see also Baldwin, supra note 45, at 731
(“If pleading guilty must be a requirement for participation (as it is for the majority of [Veterans
Treatment Courts]), including expunction upon graduation or after several years of not having
any contact with the criminal justice system might serve as an incentive for more veterans to
participate.”); Arno, supra note 6, at 1069 (describing the question of the legal impact of graduating
from Veterans Treatment Court upon a justice-involved veteran as one of the most crucial decisions
that a Veterans Treatment Court needs to make).
86

87

See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 744.

For one of several good existing summaries of this history and modern trend arising from
this background, see Perlin, supra note 6, at 452– 63.
88

89

Holder Remarks, supra note 47; see supra notes 38– 43 and accompanying text.

See Cartwright, supra note 6, at 302–03; Hawkins, supra note 6, at 564, 568–70; Martin,
supra note 4; McMichael, supra note 69; Moga, supra note 44; Steele, supra note 71.
90

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss1/3

14

Pomerance: The Best-Fitting Uniform: Balancing Legislative Standards and Jud

2018

The Best-Fitting Uniform

193

From an equal application of justice perspective, however, the lack of
uniformity among these courts remains troubling.91 While complete procedural
rigidity among any subset of courts is already known to be impractical and
undesirable, court system participants—and, indeed, the general public overall—
deserve at least some standardized set of expectations and criteria by which an
entity labeling itself a “Veterans Treatment Court” must abide.92 It is the question
of who should develop and enforce these standards, as well as what court-related
matters should remain unregulated, to which this article moves next.93

III. The Controversial Balance: Judicial Autonomy
and Extrajudicial Restraints
Debates over judicial autonomy in the United States date back to the days
before the United States even existed.94 In declaring their independence from Great
Britain, the North American rebels cited King George III’s absolute control over
the actions of colonial judges as a primary example of how the Crown had violated
the most basic principles of good and reasonable governance.95 Shortly afterward,
while trying to rally public support for the ratification of the Constitution of the
United States, Alexander Hamilton touted the founding document’s creation of
a judicial branch steeped in principles of “independence” and “firmness.”96 To
Hamilton, a government in which the judiciary remained under the thumb of
the legislative or executive branches would pose the gravest possible threat to the
liberty that America’s revolutionaries had fought for so long to secure.97
More than two hundred years later, however, disputes about the proper
balance between judicial autonomy and regulation from the other two arms of
government continue to rage on in the United States.98 The guiding desire to
maintain a judiciary that is “not under the thumb of other branches of Govern
91

See infra notes 92, 188–207 and accompanying text.

92

See, e.g., Arno, supra note 6, at 1069 –70, 1072; Shah, supra note 7, at 105–06.

93

See infra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

94

See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530–32 (1933).

William R. Everdell, The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republicans 291
(2d ed. 2000).
95

96
The Federalist No. 78, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
97

Id. at 402–06.

See Russell Wheeler, Judicial Independence in the United States of America, Judicial
Independence in Transition 521–65 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012); Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial
Independence and Social Welfare, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 575, 606–21 (2014); Susan J. Becker, The
Evolution Toward Judicial Independence in the Continuing Quest for LGBT Equality, 64 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 863, 866–95 (2014). In many ways, contemporary debates regarding judicial
autonomy and judicial independence in the United States are extremely similar to the arguments
held regarding this topic several decades ago. See generally Francis K. Zemans, Judicial Independence
and Accountability Symposium, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 625 (1999); Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681 (1979); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence,
35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 108 (1970).
98
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ment, and therefore equipped to administer the law impartially” continues to
exist in the United States, at least in principle.99 Indeed, the degree of separation
between the judiciary and the other governmental entities is now a criterion
which many observers use in judging whether a nation can legitimately anoint
itself a member of the democratic world.100 Yet, challenges arise from the fact that
courts do not exist in a vacuum.101 Rather, they are a component of the entire
mechanism of the Republican form of government in the United States.102 As a
result, expecting courts to somehow function completely autonomously from the
remainder of the government is as unrealistic today as it was centuries ago.103
From this situation, a constant tug-of-war emerges between judges who want
to remain as independent as possible and representatives of the two other branches
that want to exercise at least some modicum of control over the judiciary’s
activities.104 This tension is not only acceptable, but desirable. 105 In fact, one
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary, 85
Neb. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2011).
99

100
See Ian Johnson, China Grants Courts Greater Autonomy on Limited Matters, N.Y. Times
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/world/asia/china-grants-courts-greaterautonomy-on-limited-matters.html?_r=1; Jan van Zyl Smit, Judicial Independence in Latin America:
The Implications of Tenure and Appointment Processes, Bingham Ctr. for the Rule of Law 2, 13
(2016), http://ariaslaw.com/boletines/Publicaciones%202016/2%20Judicial%20Indep%20in%20
Latin%20America%20-%20Report%202016-04%20FINAL%20FOR%20WEB.pdf; Nathan J.
Brown, Egypt’s Judges in a Revolutionary Age, The Carnegie Papers 3–8 (Feb. 2012), http://carnegie
endowment.org/files/egypt_judiciary.pdf.
101
See Judith Resnik, Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why and How to Value
the Independence of Which Judges, 137 Daedalus 28, 28–31 (2008).

See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Courts and Congress Collide, And Why Their Conflicts
Subside, Am. Bar Ass’n, 8–9, 27 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/
public_education/whycourtscongresscollide.pdf.
102

103
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political Environment, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 1–3
(2006); Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence, Autonomy but
Reciprocity”: A First Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative Committees, 46 Mercer L.
Rev. 667, 667, 669–70 (1995); Geyh, supra note 102, at 8–9; Resnik, supra note 101, at 38–42.
In the words of former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger: “There can, of
course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and absolute independence
of judges in deciding cases . . . But it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex
system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting judicial business . . . [C]an each judge
be an absolute monarch and yet have a complex judicial system function efficiently?” J. Clifford
Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe With Only Chiefs, 1978 BYU L.
Rev. 39, 56–57 (1978) (quoting former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger).

Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in
the New Republic, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 31, 86–87 (1998) (describing the relationship between the
judiciary and the other two branches of government as involving both judicial independence and
some level of inter-branch co-equality); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over Judicial Rulemaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 1–3 (1958)
(discussing the struggle for control over developing and implementing court rules among the three
branches of government).
104

See Amar, supra note 1, at 60–64 (noting the inter-branch tensions implicit to a system of
separation of powers).
105
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can reasonably argue that this is the exact climate the Framers of the United
States constitution strove to create when building a structure where each branch
possessed powers to check the other two.106 Through this system, where the three
arms of government are at once partly independent from each other and partly
responsible to each other, one can hope for an ultimate result that keeps these
various governmental bodies in some level of balance for the overall betterment of
the public.107
The question, then, is not whether the legislative and executive branches
can enact any significant constraints upon the courts, but rather what regula
tions and controls the so-called “political branches” may permissibly impose
on the theoretically impartial judiciary.108 Overall, some of the harshest
contentions in this area emerge from conflicts about funding.109 Cases abound
concerning disputes over legislative and executive determinations regarding
precisely how much money the judiciary should receive to carry out all
aspects of its constitutionally appointed mission.110 Judicial leaders argue frequently
that they need full autonomy over their own budget, as they possess unique
expertise about how to most effectively administer their own necessary functions.111
Judicial leaders further claim that legislators and executives could withhold
funds as a form of retribution for a decision these lawmakers did not like, or
threaten to reduce judicial budgets if judges fail to rule a particular way on a
specific issue, thereby severely restricting the impartiality of the courts.112 On
See id; see also Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Renewing Congress: A Second
Report 78 (1993); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the
American Bar Association Committee on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, 12 St. John’s
J. Legal Comment 69, 69 (1996); see Paul R. Verkuil, A Proposal to Resolve Interbranch Disputes on
the Practice Field, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 839, 841– 42 (1991); Douglas W. Kimec, Of Balkanized
Empires and Cooperative Allies: A Bicentennial Essay on the Separation of Powers, 37 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 73, 75–78 (1988) (praising the overall outcomes of the Framers’ system of separation of
powers, despite the inter-branch tensions that such a structure provides); Thomas O. Sargentich,
Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 430,
464–68 (1987).
106

107
Posner, supra note 103, at 1 (“[O]ur democracy requires a degree of judicial autonomy
but also of checks and balances. Just as the other branches of government are subject to checks
and balances, judges must not be treated as monarchical or oligarchical figures immune from all
democratic control.”).
108

See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 104.

See, e.g., William Scott Ferguson, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57
Cornell L. Rev. 975, 975–76 (1972); Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 Md. L. Rev. 217, 219–23 (1993).
109

110

For one of several existing summaries about such cases, see Jackson, supra note 109, at

227–47.
111
Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 Pace L. Rev. 111,
111–12 (1994); G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the
Purse, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 88 Judicature 12, 14–19 (2004).
112

Ferguson, supra note 109, at 975–76; Jackson, supra note 109, at 224–25.
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the other hand, leaders from the legislative and executive branches assert that
American voters entrust them with the responsibility of using public monies
prudently and avoiding extravagant governmental spending, a trust they would
violate if they lacked power to scrutinize the judiciary’s budget and reject items
that appear superfluous or excessive.113 Jurisprudence regarding these disputes
varies widely, but one principle generally remains constant throughout these
decisions: the concurrent need for the judiciary to remain at least somewhat
accountable to the democratically elected leaders and for the legislative and
executive branches to avoid arbitrary or capricious cuts of the judicial budget.114
Other inter-branch conflicts regarding court administration include clashes
regarding a court’s ability to hire or terminate courthouse personnel, to negotiate
contractual terms with employee unions, to buy office equipment necessary to
the proper functioning of the court, to compel funds for the necessary upkeep
of courthouse facilities, and other “logistic or housekeeping” concerns for the
judiciary.115 Often, though not always, the judicial branch has maintained a
substantial level of autonomy in these areas, subject to legislative or executive
overrule only if the judicial purchases or other decisions under review are blatantly
wasteful or otherwise unreasonable.116
A separate category of these inter-branch conflicts includes issues regarding
judicial autonomy over processes of courtroom procedural fairness. For instance,
judges have long held the ability to establish rules governing appropriate
conduct within their own courtrooms and to sanction individuals who violate
those rules.117 Likewise, courts often set time limits for certain procedures where
no statute of limitations exists in the law, and receive substantial deference when
parties attempt to challenge these constraints.118 In certain circumstances, judges
113

Webb & Whittington, supra note 111, at 15–16.

See Webb & Whittington, supra note 111, at 45; Jackson, supra note 109, at 227–47;
Ferguson, supra note 109, at 980–86; see also Posner, supra note 103, at 1 (discussing the need for a
balance between judicial independence and accountability to the public).
114

115
Lyn Laufenberg & Geoffrey Van Remmen, Courts: Inherent Power and Administrative Court
Reform, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 133, 135 (1975); Jackson, supra note 109, at 221 n.26.

See Peter Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration 92 (2015);
Steven W. Hays & James W. Douglas, Judicial Administration: Modernizing the Third Branch, in
Handbook of Public Administration 1005– 06 (Jack Rabin, W. Bartley Hildreth & Gerald J.
Muller eds., 3d ed. 2007) (ebook).
116

117
Jackson, supra note 109, at 221 n.28 (discussing several court cases and scholarly com
mentaries affirming a broad degree of judicial discretion in this area).
118
For a sampling of circuit court cases affirming this traditional area of broadly construed
judicial autonomy, see Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1408 (11th Cir. 2011);
Thanedar v. Time Warner, Inc., 352 F. App’x 891, 896 (5th Cir. 2009); Sparshott v. Feld Entm’t,
Inc., 311 F.3d 425, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1514–15 (9th Cir.
1996); Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 678 (8th Cir. 1987); MCI Comm. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1172–73 (7th Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), as recognized in Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell
Atlantic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. D.C. 2002).
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may make and enforce rules of evidence and jurisdiction, as long as these rules
do not conflict with existing federal or state evidentiary or jurisdictional laws.119
Judges have the authority to decide whether to grant bail and, if granted,
to decide what amount of money constitutes reasonable bail in the case at
hand.120 They have broad discretion to determine whether an individual possesses
the proper mental capacity to comprehend court proceedings and whether an
individual needs a guardian assigned to represent his or her best interests.121 Judges
also have the power to appoint counsel to ensure representation for a defendant
in a criminal proceeding.122 They have significant independence to manage their
own court’s calendar and compel parties to appear on a date and time of the
judge’s choosing.123 In all of these areas, judges maintain a substantial degree of
self-determination, and are granted wide latitude to make decisions as long as
their choices are not arbitrary or capricious.124
However, the other two branches of government continue to impose
noteworthy restraints upon the judicial branch.125 Near the end of the nineteenth
century, for instance, many states enacted legislation preventing judges from
“summing up” evidence for a criminal trial’s jury in a manner that revealed
the judge’s opinions regarding the value of evidence presented at the trial.126
Legislatures determined that judges too often provided this summation in a
manner biasing jurors toward one side in the case, causing them to decide that
this practice harmed the central policy goal of preventing judges from influencing
juries about the facts of a case.127 Lawmakers establish other means of “saving
119

Jackson, supra note 109, at 221 n.28.

120

Ferguson, supra note 109, at 976 n.5.

Yitshak Cohen, The Right of a Minor to Independent Status—Three Models, 10 Nw. J. L.
& Soc. Pol’y 1, 26 (2015); Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited
Guardianship, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 735, 738 (2002); Thomas Upchurch, Guardianship Appointment
at Judge’s Discretion, Thomas Upchurch Attorney at Law (Dec. 22, 2016, 9:15 PM), http://www.
upchurchlaw.com/guardianship-appointment-at-judges-discretion/.
121

Laura B. Hardwicke, After Mallard v. United States: The Federal Courts’ Inherent Power
to Appoint Representation for Indigent Civil Litigants, 22 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 715, 716 n.4 (1991);
Ferguson, supra note 109, at 976 n.5.
122

See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1998); Joseph J. Janatka, The Inherent Power: An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65
Wash. U. L. Rev. 429, 438 (1987); Carolyn L. Dessin, Civil Procedure—Federal District Courts
Have Inherent Power to Sanction Attorneys for Abuse of the Judicial Process, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 1073,
1090 (1986) (“[T]he power to control the docket arguably is included in the type of inherent power
arising from the nature of the court and necessary to the exercise of all judicial powers.”).
123

124

See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.

125

See Posner, supra note 103, at 1.

Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do it So Differently
from Just About Everyone Else, 30 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 11–14 (2013); see generally Curtis
Wright, Jr., Instructions to the Jury: Summary Without Comment, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. 177 (1954).
126

127

See Marcus, supra note 126.
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judges from themselves” through laws that prevent judges from engaging in
behaviors that give the appearance of impropriety, and require judges to disclose
certain aspects of their extra-judicial activities to the public.128 These statutes
represent policy judgments that the will of the people is best served when judges
are prevented from conflicts of interest. This heightens the public confidence in
the impartiality of these judges and encourages members of the public to respect
judicial outcomes.129
Sentencing policies represent another form of legislative and executive control
over court procedures.130 While statutes establishing mandatory minimum
sentences for certain criminal offenses proved controversial from the outset, with
courts making the case that too many rigidly constructed sentencing laws remove
too much discretion from trial judges to hand down a punishment truly befitting
of the guilty party’s crime, the basic concept behind such laws fits the notion
of judicial accountability in a democratic society.131 The voters empower their
elected representatives in the legislative and executive branches to advocate for
policy decisions the people want, including the difficult determination of how
severely society wants to punish a particular crime.132 Mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes, therefore, represent the will of the people to see certain types
of legally proscribed conduct punished in a particular way.133 Given that it is the
people’s representatives who establish the laws forbidding certain actions within
the United States, again representing the will of the public to see such conduct
banned, it logically follows that these same representatives would also codify the
public’s desires to see such acts punished to a certain level, as long as that degree
of punishment remains constitutional and rational.134
Mira Gur-Arie & Russell Wheeler, Judicial Independence in the United States: Current Issues
and Relevant Background Information, in Office of Democracy & Governance, Guidance for
Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality 133, 137–38 (2002), http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/pnacm007.pdf.
128

129

Id.

See Paul Larkin & Evan Bernick, Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The
Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, Heritage Foundation (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.
heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/reconsidering-mandatory-minimum-sentences-thearguments-and-against.
130

131
See generally Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and
a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017 (2004) (stating that overly
rigid sentencing requirements constrain judges too much and can lead to unjust outcomes, but
pointing out that the concept of giving the people a chance, through their representatives, to
establish policy judgments regarding sentencing is meritorious).

Book Note, Determinate Sentencing and Judicial Participation in Democratic Punishment,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 947, 952 (1995) (reviewing Lois G. Forer, A Rage to Punish: The
Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing (1994)) [hereinafter Participation in
Democratic Punishment].
132

133

Id. at 952.

See id; see also Larkin & Bernick, supra note 130. Of course, elected representatives must
fulfill their role of translating the people’s desires into sensible policies that do not offend basic
134
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Many other matters of court procedure receive significant legislative
oversight.135 For example, while the United States Supreme Court promulgates
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the proposed rules then receive the scrutiny
of Congress, which has seven months to decide whether to exercise its veto
power over the promulgated rules.136 A similar review process exists regarding the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which Congress adopted only after making multiple
revisions to the recommended rules the United States Supreme Court drafted.137
Many state legislatures retain the right expressly to veto or revise internally
developed local court rules, “where the major premises of the court appear to
conflict with policies which the legislators feel should be asserted.”138 In all of
these examples, the common thread once again becomes the transmission of
the public’s input in these bedrock matters of policy through the representatives
whom the people elect to make these decisions on their behalf.
From this brief discussion, one can observe a few general principles about the
realistic interplay between these three co-equal branches of government.139 First,
legislative and executive measures designed to coerce judges into deciding cases
in a certain manner or otherwise impairing judicial independence blatantly
offend the core intentions of the United States Constitution and all subsequent
laws attempting to preserve judicial impartiality.140 By the same token, legislative
and executive actions reasonably designed to prevent judges and other judicial
branch personnel from compromising situations are proper checks on judicial
autonomy, as they represent the public’s desire and need for a court system that
distances itself from undue influence and other forms of impropriety.141
Secondly, courts typically maintain ample judicial autonomy over
“housekeeping” matters, such as managing personnel, courthouse upkeep,
societal objectives, such as the constitutional prohibition against punishments that are cruel and
unusual. See Sarah Kelman, Comparative Analysis of Democracy and Sentencing in the United States
as a Model for Reform in Iraq, 33 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 303, 305 (2004).
135

See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.

Nathan R. Sellers, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: Why the Court
Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 327,
328 (2011) (“[Enacting new Rules of Civil Procedure] requires approval from both the judicial
and legislative branches of the Federal Government and gains legitimacy from its methodical nature
and transparency.”).
136

Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure,
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1107 n.16 (2002). While distinctions certainly exist between the
legislative-judicial balance regarding the Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
fact remains that both of these extremely important sets of court rules are not made by courts alone,
but rather, establish democratic legitimacy by engaging the people’s representatives in the process of
amending the existing rules. See id; Sellers, supra note 136.
137

138

Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 17–18.

139

See supra notes 108–38 and accompanying text.

140

See supra notes 94–97, 99 –100, and accompanying text.

141

See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
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negotiating contracts, and scheduling court calendars.142 As a basic rule,
only in instances involving a gross abuse of judicial discretion may the other
branches interfere with these decisions.143 In addition, certain processes remain
the traditional domain of judges, including setting bail, accepting or rejecting
letters rogatory, assigning counsel, and declaring that a party needs a guardian to
properly represent his or her interests.144 Here, too, the legislative and executive
branches generally maintain the power to overrule the judiciary only if the judge’s
decisions are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise patently abusive.145
Lastly, the legislative and executive branches rightfully play a larger role
in decisions where matters of judicial administration implicate fundamental
questions of public policy. These branches represent the will of the people in
issues such as deciding what types of cases a court can and cannot hear, what
forms of evidence a court must refuse to consider under certain situations, what
types of interaction a judge should refrain from having with a jury, and what types
of punishments are necessary to achieve societal criminal justice goals.146 The
electorate must live with the practical effects of these broadly ranging choices.147
The outcomes of these matters directly impact the lives of American citizens.
Their choices will impact verdicts of innocence or guilt, affect the public’s faith
in the judiciary to render legitimately impartial decisions, and declare where
American goals and priorities reside within the criminal justice system.148 In such
matters, the courts must listen to the legislative and executive leaders whom the
public entrusts with ensuring their voices are heard and stand accountable to the
rationally applied will of the people.149
However, this does not inherently mean that the “political branches” usurp
all levels of judicial control in each of these situations.150 Instead, the proper goal,
as illustrated by some of the above-mentioned examples, is the development
of a productive power-sharing arrangement among the three branches.151 In a
142

See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.

143

See supra notes 114 –15 and accompanying text.

144

See supra notes 117–24 and accompanying text.

145

See supra notes 117– 24 and accompanying text.

146

See supra notes 126–27, 130–38 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 126–27, 130–38 and accompanying text; see also infra note 149 and
accompanying text.
147

148

See supra notes 126 –38 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 103, at 1; Sellers, supra note 136, at 328; Participation in
Democratic Punishment, supra note 132, at 952; Larkin & Bernick, supra note 130.
149

150

See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 17–18; Struve, supra note 137.

See, e.g., Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 104, at 17–18; Sellers, supra note 136; Struve,
supra note 137; Wallace, supra note 103, at 56 –57. As a cautionary tale, one can look at the ongoing
problems regarding mandatory sentencing laws. While the spirit behind these laws is proper, giving
the people a voice in defining what punishments are appropriate for people who commit illegal
acts, some of these laws are overly confining and remove too much discretion from trial court
151

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss1/3

22

Pomerance: The Best-Fitting Uniform: Balancing Legislative Standards and Jud

2018

The Best-Fitting Uniform

201

government intended from the outset to preserve the tensions that an array of
checks naturally cause, these give-and-take inter-branch relationships form a
desirable relative balance between autonomy and accountability.152 With this in
mind, this article now addresses a rationale for a similarly balanced approach of
concurrent powers in the Veterans Treatment Court context.153

IV. A Necessary Balance: Inter-Branch Approaches
for Veterans Treatment Courts
The history of diversion courts or problem-solving courts frequently
illustrates the judicial branch taking the lead in both program creation and
administration.154 Drug Treatment Courts started as a concept that judges
and other justice professionals developed, rather than as a new legislative or
executive creation.155 As an offspring of this model, the nation’s first Veterans
Treatment Courts began because of the initiatives of Judge Murphy and Judge
Russell, not through the work of innovative statutes or executive orders.156 Since
then, some states have enacted legislation encouraging the creation of Veterans
Treatment Courts and establishing some threshold criteria for the work of these
courts.157 Still, in the majority of jurisdictions with Veterans Treatment Courts,
the bulk of the criteria-setting work remains solely within the discretion of the
judicial branch.158 With such a court-centric legacy in mind, plenty of judges
argue that any measure other than leaving oversight of Veterans Treatment Courts
exclusively within the purview of the judicial branch would amount to breaking
a system not yet broken.159
Unfortunately, this complete lack of statutory control over most Veterans
Treatment Courts has produced an undesirable level of inconsistency.160 Basic
standards often vary widely among Veterans Treatment Courts within the same
judges to allow for case-specific sentencing determinations. Overall, laws that strike a more balanced
approach, establishing sentencing guidelines but permitting judges to deviate from these guidelines
in extreme circumstances, have achieved considerably greater success and far broader acceptance. See
supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text; see also Kelman, supra note 134, at 305
(discussing the democratic necessity of establishing a “balance between democracy and justice”).
152

153

See infra notes 154–230 and accompanying text.

See generally Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Judges and Problem-Solving Courts, Ctr. For
Court Innovation (2002).
154

Lauren Kirchner, Remembering the Drug Court Revolution, Pacific Standard (Apr. 25,
2014), http://psmag.com/remembering-the-drug-court-revolution-be13836c4be3#.9cj6psogq.
155

156

See supra notes 17– 43 and accompanying text.

157

See infra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.

158

Shah, supra note 7, at 67.

159

See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.

Arno, supra note 6, at 1052, 1060– 61; Baldwin, supra note 45, at 722–33; Jones, supra
note 6, at 310; Perlin, supra note 6, at 457–59.
160
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state.161 The components of a Veterans Treatment Court in any given county
can be drastically different than the components of a Veterans Treatment Court
situated in an adjoining county.162 While differences in resources, population,
and other localized factors make homogeneity among Veterans Treatment
Courts both impossible to achieve and detrimental to seek, a basic level of
standardization codified in statute would prove desirable and proper for the
following reasons.163

A. Democratic Accountability
Tribunals consistently hold that no party possesses the right to have a case
transferred to a Veterans Treatment Court.164 Appearing in a Veterans Treatment
Court, therefore, equates to a privilege that a court system may grant under
certain circumstances.165 In most jurisdictions today, these case-by-case decisions
are simply a matter of “feel” made in some courts by the presiding judge, in
others by the District Attorney, and in others by some combination of the judge,
prosecutor, and defense counsel.166 Understandably, there is no exacting formula
applicable across all scenarios to decide whether a case warrants transfer into a
Veterans Treatment Court.167 Since appearing in a Veterans Treatment Court
is not a legal entitlement, judges and other criminal justice personnel deserve
enough latitude to make the decision that fits the unique facts and circumstances
of a particular justice-involved veteran and the general public as a whole.168
However, selecting which cases a Veterans Treatment Court should handle
involves multiple financial, practical, and ethical considerations from which
the public should not be left out.169 Deciding which services the court needs to
provide to a justice-involved veteran, what threshold standards a justice-involved
161

See Shah, supra note 7, at 81– 84.

162

See id.

163

See infra notes 164–230 and accompanying text.

Eric Merriam, Non-Uniform Justice: An Equal Protection Analysis of Veterans Treatment
Courts’ Exclusionary Qualification Requirements, 84 Miss. L.J. 685, 714 (2015).
164

Id.; see also Veterans Court, Law For Veterans, http://www.lawforveterans.org/veteranscourts (last visited Dec. 14, 2016) (“It is important to remember, no veteran has a ‘right’ to have
their case assigned to Veterans Court. Once in Veterans Court, the veteran must continuously ‘earn’
the privilege of remaining in Veterans Court by complying with all the Court’s requirements.”).
165

166

See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.

See Arno, supra note 6, at 1060–61; Jones, supra note 6, at 310; Merriam, supra note 164,
at 698–99.
167

168

Shah, supra note 7, at 81–82; Rafferty, supra note 9.

See Posner, supra note 103, at 1 (pointing out the importance of democratic control as a
check on the power of courts). This does not mean that Veterans Treatment Court judges would
or should lose all of their discretion to manage these courts, but rather signifies the need for a
multi-branch collaboration in establishing and administering more uniform standards. See Kelman,
supra note 134, at 305; Posner, supra note 103, at 1; Wallace, supra note 103, at 56 –57.
169
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veteran must meet before graduating from a Veterans Treatment Court, and what
impact this graduation has upon the veteran’s criminal charges are likewise policy
matters that merit some level of public contribution.170
A simple example illustrates this point. If a Veterans Treatment Court accepts
only veterans possessing an honorable discharge, then every veteran in the court
will be eligible to receive key treatment services and other benefits from the
VA.171 One could argue, however, that a Veterans Treatment Court accepting only
honorably discharged veterans excludes the very people whom such a program
is designed to help: individuals who served in the Armed Forces but who now
face barriers to reintegrating into civilian life.172 On the other hand, if a Veterans
Treatment Court accepts all veterans regardless of discharge, then many veterans
will not be eligible for VA benefits and services, meaning community providers
will need to fill this void.173 Decisions that can leave such a lasting impact upon
members of the public warrant input from the individuals whom the people elect
to represent their interests.174

170
See infra notes 171–74 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes 94–152 and
accompanying text.
171
See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (“The term ‘veteran’ means a person who served in the
active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions
other than dishonorable.”).
172

Merriam, supra note 164, at 726–27, 738–40.

Id. at 738– 40; Cartwright, supra note 6, at 306; Moga, supra note 44. This question
becomes even more challenging when considering the large number of veterans who improperly
received a less-than-honorable discharge from the military. See John Rowan, A Less Than
Honorable Policy, N.Y. Times (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/30/opinion/aless-than-honorable-policy.html. For instance, the Pentagon recently acknowledged that tens
of thousands of veterans of the Vietnam War developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
during their military service that was never properly diagnosed or treated, leading the military
to issue less-than-honorable discharges to them when their PTSD manifested itself in behaviors
that the military deemed unacceptable. Karen Sloan, Yale Helps PTSD Sufferers, Nat’l L.J. (July
6, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202731282790/Yale-Helps-PTSD-Sufferers
?slreturn=20150715122112. Others received a less-than-honorable discharge solely on the basis
of declaring that they were homosexuals. David F. Burrelli & Jody Feder, Homosexuals and the
U.S. Military: Current Issues, Cong. Research Serv. at 2 n.7, 9–10, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL30113.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2016). Whether a Veterans Treatment Court should automatically
exclude all such individuals is a matter of public policy that the people’s elected representatives need
to decide for their constituents. See Merriam, supra note 164, at 742– 43.
173

See Sellers, supra note 136, at 328 (discussing the need for democratic participation in
such areas). In the often-repeated words of Alexander Hamilton: “The Judiciary . . . has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society, and can take no active resolution whatsoever. It may truly be said to have neither [f ]orce nor
[w]ill.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). A matter that directly impacts “the purse”
of the people, such as the scenario described above, is therefore best suited for the people’s elected
representatives to resolve. See generally supra notes 94–153 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinctions between areas that are historically the sole province of the judiciary and areas that
necessitate participation by the people’s elected representatives).
174
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While elected officials must exercise self-restraint and reserve enough statutory
flexibility for Veterans Treatment Court judges to properly manage their own
courtrooms, state legislatures and executives should enact and enforce statutes
defining policy matters.175 Examples of these areas include the baseline criteria for
entry into a Veterans Treatment Court, the basic standards a veteran must meet
to stay in and to graduate from the program, and the standard obligations that a
Veterans Treatment Court owes to a veteran.176 Without such principles codified
in law, the public would be forced to accept the judiciary’s decisions in these areas,
even if made without the involvement of the people affected.177 Such an outcome
would represent an unacceptable overreach of power by the judicial branch.178

B. Comprehendible and Consistent Labeling
When a court decides to establish and maintain an entity labeled as a
“Veterans Treatment Court,” then the members of the general public have a right
to know what minimum thresholds this entity must meet to bear this label.179 To
increase public understanding regarding what this label means, legislation should
include common criteria by which all entities using this label must abide.180
To an extent, this concept is analogous to labeling certain types of food
“organic” or “kosher.”181 Laws and regulations governing the minimum standards
food must meet to be labeled organic or kosher exist to create a basic level of
expectations among producers and consumers.182 The same basic rationale holds
true for a Veterans Treatment Court. If courts within a state wish to create

175

See infra notes 176–231 and accompanying text.

176

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

177

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

178

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

179

See infra notes 180–87 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 146 – 49, and accompanying text (discussing the rightful role of the voting
public in broad policy matters regarding the court system).
180

181
See Kate L. Harrison, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic Standards, 25
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 211, 213, 215–19 (2008); Marian Burros, U.S. Imposes Standards for Organic
Food-Labeling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2000, at A22; Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 671 (1993).

Harrison, supra note 181, at 216 (“Congress began working on the regulations with the
initial goal of creating consistent federal standards that would eliminate consumer confusion by
providing ‘a clear picture of just what organically grown really means.’”); Masoudi, supra note
181, at 671 (“New York enacted the first kosher food law in 1915 in response to the ‘chaotic
state of the kosher food industry—its charlatans, profiteers, and outright crooks—which . . . made
any assurance of [validity of a product labeled ‘kosher’] all but impossible.”); see also Timothy D.
Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food 112 (2013) (noting that
more than twenty states have adopted laws defining minimum standards of the term ‘kosher’ to
guard against fraud and help marketplace consumers understand what it means when a product
bears this label).
182
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subdivisions carrying the “Veterans Treatment Court” label, then it follows
logically that the state would want to declare the minimum standards a court
must meet to hold this label.183
By failing to incorporate minimum standards when designating a tribunal, a
Veterans Treatment Court can produce an unnecessary level of confusion within
a state. Without some basic standardization, a court could form an entity that
calls itself a Veterans Treatment Court even if this entity fails to offer many of the
most basic components of such a court, like a mentor program and connections
to VA services.184 These failures in turn, could lead to justice-involved veterans
seeking to enter a “Veterans Treatment Court” without fully comprehending the
requirements and offerings of that particular court, creating a breeding ground for
misconceptions which benefit no one.185
Establishing a greater level of uniformity will create a far more consistent
understanding of what this term means between courtroom participants and
the taxpaying public overall.186 With such basic standards in place, individuals
throughout a state will better understand what it means to establish and maintain
a Veterans Treatment Court. This comprehension will prevent a court from
carrying this label if it fails to meet the threshold criteria that the people, speaking
through their popularly elected representatives, deem essential.187
183
See supra notes 179– 82 and accompanying text. This does not insinuate that legislation is
a magic panacea for anything that ails Veterans Treatment Courts. Indeed, commentators point out
flaws regarding the food labeling regulation laws, particularly a concerning lack of governmental
enforcement that undermines the effectiveness of these standards that are meant to promote greater
uniformity. Lytton, supra note 182, at 112–15. However, one would reasonably expect that a
state would be able to more easily regulate the major activities of a close-knit network of Veterans
Treatment Courts than it could the thousands of kosher food certifiers, suppliers, and retailers that
operate private enterprises within a state’s borders. See id. (noting that enforceability of legislation
is a significant problem in the kosher food industry due to the large and varied number of privatesector participants in this field).

See Arno, supra note 6, at 1041– 42 (describing the current lack of standardization among
Veterans Treatment Courts and the need to develop standards among these courts based on best
practices). A 2016 survey of seventy-nine Veterans Treatment Courts found that more than 20% of
the Veterans Treatment Courts examined did not offer a mentor program. Baldwin, supra note 45,
at 746. In this same survey, some courts reported offering only non-VA services in key areas, such as
substance abuse treatments. Id. at 747. A surprisingly large number of Veterans Treatment Courts
surveyed did not require random drug testing or drug and alcohol monitoring, despite the fact that
monitoring the sobriety of program participants through “frequent alcohol and drug testing” is
one of the “Ten Key Components of Veterans Treatment Courts” widely promoted as vital bedrock
principles for any Veterans Treatment Court. Id. at 743; Justice For Vets, The Ten Key Components
of Veterans Treatment Court, http://justiceforvets.org/sites/default/files/files/Ten%20Key%20
Components%20of%20Veterans%20Treatment%20Courts%20.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2016)
[hereinafter Ten Key Components].
184

185

See Arno, supra note 6, at 1060; Jones, supra note 6, at 310; Shah, supra note 7, at 105.

See supra notes 61– 87 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of greater uniformity
among Veterans Treatment Courts).
186

187

See Shah, supra note 7, at 106.
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C. Equal Access to Justice
Consistency is a bedrock goal of the criminal justice system.188 While absolute
constancy in the application of every aspect of criminal justice is impossible, basic
access to justice remains an area in which consistency is necessary.189 One would
reasonably criticize a statewide criminal justice structure in which defendants
received the right to counsel in only half of the state’s counties. One would like
wise argue against a scenario in which a statutory sentencing range for a particular
crime applied in only one-third of the counties, leaving judges at liberty to impose
a sentence of any length in the remaining counties.190
Unfortunately, states open the door to a similarly inequitable system when
they fail to provide statutory requirements for their Veterans Treatment Courts.191
In some states today, Veterans Treatment Courts differ markedly from county
to county.192 Without any codified standards, Veterans Treatment Court judges
and other court leaders can establish whatever demands they wish regarding the
criteria for entering, remaining in, and graduating from their court’s treatment
program.193 The court can make these requirements as stringent or as lenient as
they wish, and apply them as evenly or as haphazardly as they choose, without any
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Greenfield, Foreword, in U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, NCJ – 143505, Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System, at 31, 69
(1993); Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed Penalties,
2 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 1, 5, 67 (2000) (stating that consistency in criminal justice is one of the
keystone virtues of the rule of law).
188

John Terzano, Lack of Consistency Leads to Lack of Justice, Huffington Post (May 25,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-terzano/lack-of-consistency-leads_b_213033.html
(discussing problems arising from lack of consistency in the American criminal justice system);
Sarah Krasnostein & Arie Freiberg, Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic Sentencing Framework:
If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know When You’ve Got There?, 76 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 265, 265– 66 (2013) (describing societal concerns about the lack of consistency in sentencing
policies in Australia); Theodore Dalrymple, Jail Terms Mock Our Justice System, The Telegraph
(May 10, 2014, 5:49 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10819996/
Jail-terms-mock-our-justice-system.html (criticizing inconsistencies in the criminal justice system
in the United Kingdom).
189

Krasnostein & Freiberg, supra note 189, at 265– 66 (describing the problems that arise when
sentencing policies are inconsistently applied). Again, consistency is not equivalent with rigidity.
The “foolish consistency” that accompanies some heavily constrained mandatory sentencing laws is
arguably just as disadvantageous to the criminal justice system as lacking any consistent regulations
at all. Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal Law, 15 Bos.
U. Pub. Int. L. J. 1, 5 (2005). The objective of this article is to promote a middle ground regarding
Veterans Treatment Courts that establishes baseline standards reflective of the popular will, while
still leaving appropriate latitude for judicial discretion in individual courtrooms. See supra notes
1–16 and accompanying text.
190

191

See Cartwright, supra note 6, at 308; Perlin, supra note 6, at 457–59.

192

Shah, supra note 7, at 105.

See id.; Jones, supra note 6, at 313; Kravetz, supra note 70, at 166; Merriam, supra note 164,
at 698–99.
193
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legal consequences whatsoever.194 They can follow or ignore proven best practices
without facing any sanctions under the law.195 The court can decide which data,
if any, they wish to collect about their court’s successes and failures, as well as
determining on their own accord whether they wish to share this potentially
useful data with anyone.196
To some, this degree of judicial discretion may represent a rightful
demonstration of a truly independent judiciary.197 However, a Veterans Treatment
Court landscape lacking consistency, stability, and uniformity does not represent
a system of consistently administered justice.198 For example, if a Veterans
Treatment Court in one county demanded a nexus between a veteran’s serviceconnected disability and the crime committed, and a Veterans Treatment Court
in the adjoining county imposed no such requirement, a veteran who cannot
definitively prove such a nexus would be denied access to a Veterans Treatment
Court if he or she had the misfortune of committing an offense in the wrong
county.199 If a Veterans Treatment Court in one jurisdiction did not demand
alcohol and substance abuse testing on a regular basis during the duration of the
treatment program, and a different Veterans Treatment Court within the same
state made such demands, then a veteran’s ability to remain in the treatment
program would depend entirely upon the court in which he or she were placed.200
Prosecutors, too, could deliver arbitrary gatekeeping decisions in this completely
unrestricted universe, singlehandedly preventing a case from entering a Veterans
Treatment Court even if the presiding judge considers the individual to be an
ideal candidate for this court.201 One could easily think of many more examples
to illustrate inequities resulting from a system without any statutory constraints
in place.202

194
See supra notes 61– 87 and accompanying text (discussing the types of problems that
arise when jurisdictions fail to enact any meaningful degree of uniformity regarding Veterans
Treatment Courts).
195

See supra notes 61– 87 and accompanying text.

196

See supra notes 61–87 and accompanying text.

197

See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.

198

See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.

199

See Everett, supra note 45; Jones, supra note 6, at 309.

See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 743 (noting that a significant number of the Veterans
Treatment Courts surveyed for this study did not require random drug testing or drug and
alcohol monitoring).
200

201

See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.

For instance, certain Veterans Treatment Courts within a state lacking any statutory
guidance could restrict admission to combat veterans, while other jurisdictions within that state
could offer a Veterans Treatment Court that accepts any veteran who ever served on active duty. See
Arno, supra note 6, at 1060– 61. Some Veterans Treatment Courts in such a state could refuse to
accept any domestic violence offenders, while others could consider veterans with domestic violence
charges on a case-by-case basis. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Some Veterans Treatment
202
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Again, the existence of these inequities does not mean that statutory control
should rob every measure of discretion from Veterans Treatment Court judges.203
Such laws would be unduly rigid and would prove every bit as damaging as the
absence of any statutory oversight in this area at all.204 Yet the examples above
demonstrate that basic statutory standards are necessary to prevent unbridled
disparities among the Veterans Treatment Courts within a particular state.205
Indeed, many Veterans Treatment Court judges themselves seek at least some
basic statutory guidance to direct their decision-making in this area and to ensure
they are operating their court in a manner consistent with their state’s criminal
justice objectives.206 The absence of such baseline expectations and requirements
would impede any desire for a system striving for evenhanded justice to which
people have equal access.207

D. Historical Analogies
The previous section discussed several scenarios in which courts commonly
maintain virtually complete autonomy, as well as multiple examples where the
judiciary traditionally shares legal authority with the legislative and executive
branches.208 When comparing the questions surrounding Veterans Treatment
Courts with these historical precedents, these matters fit best with the types of
scenarios in which the three branches share control concurrently.209
Administering a Veterans Treatment Court is not a “housekeeping” issue
like maintaining court facilities or hiring and firing courthouse personnel.210
While certain personnel decisions or alterations to the court building itself
may be necessary to operate a Veterans Treatment Court properly, the complete
functioning of such a court extends far beyond these choices.211 Therefore,
while courts should continue to maintain autonomy over these decisions in the
Courts could reward a graduating veteran with full dismissal of all pending criminal charges, while
others could decide to offer conviction of a lesser offense as the only incentive for successfully
completing the treatment program. See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 731.
See supra notes 94 –152 (describing the importance of allowing the legislative and executive
branches to institute some control over the courts without ever permitting the popularly elected
branches from overstepping their constitutional grounds).
203

See, e.g., Cotton, supra note 190, at 5; Kelman, supra note 134, at 305; see also supra notes
130–34 and accompanying text.
204

205

See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.

206

Veterans Treatment Court Roundtable, supra note 74.

See Merriam, supra note 164, at 745 (“[T]he notion of ‘equal access to the courts’ appeals
to all but the least egalitarian among us.”) (emphasis omitted).
207

208

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

209

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

210

See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.

211

See supra notes 17– 60 and accompanying text.
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Veterans Treatment Court context, this does not mean all facets of a Veterans
Treatment Court should remain within the exclusive domain of the judiciary.212
Nor is a reasonable degree of legislative and executive oversight likely
to impede the judiciary’s independence in a Veterans Treatment Court.213 If
anything, the very existence of a Veterans Treatment Court automatically lessens
this concern, as the Veterans Treatment Court model calls for the prosecutor
and the defense counsel to set aside their customary adversarial roles and work
collaboratively toward a common goal of eventual rehabilitation.214 Within this
unique framework, the judge’s role is typically less formal than what one would
see during trial or a hearing, perhaps even removing his or her judicial robe and
addressing the justice-involved veteran eye-to-eye rather than from the bench.215
In this setting, the judge generally stands on the side of the veteran, ready to
remove the veteran from the program if absolutely necessary while still taking all
practical measures to set the veteran on a successful course toward graduation.216
Well-drafted laws establishing standards for operating a Veterans Treatment
Court should not obstruct the judge’s ability to carry out this role.217
Instead, issues regarding a Veterans Treatment Court’s basic obligations
effectively mirror the larger public policy questions regarding where the “political
branches” and the judiciary typically share power.218 In deciding what evidence
is admissible in a criminal trial, which sentences are proper for a given crime,
and what constitutes fundamental due process in a civil proceeding, the people’s
elected representatives rightfully play an essential role.219 As this article discussed
earlier, the concept of a Veterans Treatment Court offers many pathways that a
jurisdiction could take.220 The choices a jurisdiction ultimately makes regarding
how to structure and operate its Veterans Treatment Court implicate multiple
matters directly affecting the public and should represent the people’s choices
regarding this unique aspect of the criminal justice system.221 Logically, it follows
that the legislative and executive branches should assume a comparable measure
of authority to imbue the electorate’s voice into these important decisions.222
212

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

213

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

214

Cartwright, supra note 6, at 307; Holder Remarks, supra note 47.

215

See Perlin, supra note 6, at 475; Martin, supra note 4.

216

Ten Key Components, supra note 184.

See generally supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text (noting multiple areas of
court administration in which statutes promote, rather than hinder, the effective functioning of
the judiciary).
217

218

See supra notes 125–38 and accompanying text.

219

See supra notes 130–38 and accompanying text.

220

See supra notes 62– 87 and accompanying text.

221

See supra notes 167–78 and accompanying text.

222

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.
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One could argue that the fundamental act of creating a Veterans Treatment
Court represents such an important policy matter, and leaves such a definite
public impact, that these courts should be permitted to exist only through
express statutory authorization.223 However, such a stance supports an overly
rigid statutory regime, an equally unwarranted and unnecessary stance. 224 First,
any state which passes a law compelling each jurisdiction within its borders to
establish a Veterans Treatment Court would need to support such legislation with
adequate funding to carry out this demand.225 Failure to do so would represent
an improper unfunded mandate imposed by the legislative and executive
branches upon the judiciary.226 Furthermore, over the past few decades, courts
have maintained a proud legacy of developing novel ideas within the bounds of
existing law which focus on the rehabilitative and corrective aspects of criminal
justice, including the Drug Treatment Court model from which Veterans
Treatment Courts grew.227 Robbing the judiciary of its ability to continue this
important work would result in an unreasonable and overbroad burden being
placed upon this branch.228
Instead, the proper solution is a balanced one, which allows limited but
influential participation from each of the three branches.229 Just as the courts,
the legislature, and the executive offices work together in the many policymaking functions described earlier, this trio of co-equal branches should carry
out specific functions resulting in Veterans Treatment Courts maintaining enough
discretion to be functional while operating with enough standardization to
represent the popular will and to establish a realistically consistent application of
justice from court to court.230 The next section examines several ways in which
states are already trying to attain this balanced approach.231

V. Existing Balances: State Statutes Standardizing
Veterans Treatment Courts
The preceding three parts discussed the societal desirability and democratic
necessity for an inter-branch approach to administering Veterans Treatment
Courts.232 This article now turns to an examination of several states that have
223

See, e.g., Shah, supra note 7, at 80–81.

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of striking a
balance in this area).
224

225

See Adams et al., supra note 80, at 8.

226

See id.

227

Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 154; Kirchner, supra note 155.

228

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

229

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.

230

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

231

See infra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.

232

See supra notes 17–230 and accompanying text.
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already enacted statutes standardizing certain processes in their Veterans
Treatment Courts, as well as the Uniform Law Commission’s draft of a
Model Veterans Treatment Court Act, to study which criteria they chose to
homogenize and what factors they decided to leave up to judicial discretion.233
The article will then conclude by offering a series of recommendations
regarding which elements of a Veterans Treatment Court’s operations warrant
regulation from the legislative and executive branches and what aspects
should remain solely in the hands of the courts.234

A. Illinois
The State of Illinois enacted its Veterans and Servicemembers Treatment
Court Act (Act) in 2010, just two years after Judge Russell’s Veterans Treatment
Court opened in Buffalo.235 Incorporated within the state’s Corrections Law,
the statute permits the existence of only one “Veterans and Servicemembers
Court” per state judicial circuit, with all other courts throughout that circuit
able to transfer eligible cases to this specialty court.236 It permits such courts to
exist under either a pre-plea or post-plea model, depending on the consent of the
prosecutor.237 The statute restricts eligibility to individuals who were discharged
from active duty military service “under conditions other than dishonorable,”
mirroring the VA’s definition of the word “veteran.”238 However, the language
of the statute also opens the doors of these courts to men and women currently
serving in the Armed Forces, including the National Guard and the Reserves.239
Ironically, this law permits these courts to accept presently serving National Guard
members and Reservists, but does not allow for these courts to accept individuals
whose only form of military service came in the Guard or the Reserves.240
All Veterans and Servicemembers Courts created in Illinois must follow the
“nationally recommended 10 key components of drug courts” in their standards,
processes, and procedures.241 All such courts are required to bring together

233

See infra notes 235–394 and accompanying text.

234

See infra notes 395–455 and accompanying text.

730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 167/1–167/35 (2017). See also Veterans’ Court Offer Soldiers a 2nd
Chance, Illinois Lawyer Now, Winter 2011, at 1, 4. At least two Veterans Treatment Courts had
opened in Illinois before the state’s legislature passed this law. Id. at 1.
235

236

730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 167/15.

237

Id. 167/10, 167/20.

238

Id. 167/10.

Id. (“‘Servicemember’ means a person who is currently serving in the Army, Air Force,
Marines, Navy, or Coast Guard on active duty, reserve status[,] or in the National Guard.”).
239

240

See id.

241

Id.
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alcohol and substance abuse professionals, mental health experts, VA
representatives, local social services programs, and other team members whom
the presiding judge deems necessary to a justice-involved veteran’s successful
treatment and rehabilitation.242
The Act devotes an entire section to eligibility criteria.243 The prosecutor
and the presiding judge play a “co-gatekeeper” function in Illinois, with the
consent of both parties—as well as consent from the defendant—necessary to
transfer a case from a traditional criminal court into a Veterans and Servicemembers Court.244 Any defendant convicted of a crime for which the state does
not offer the possibility of probation is automatically ineligible for entry into these
courts.245 Additionally, the Act bars the doors of these courts to defendants charged
with a “crime of violence” as defined by this statute and defendants convicted
of such a crime within the past decade.246 The presiding judge also possesses
complete discretion to reject a defendant if the judge believes the defendant “does
not demonstrate a willingness to participate in a treatment program,” even if
both the prosecutor and defense counsel agree that the individual belongs in a
Veterans and Servicemembers Court setting.247
Before accepting a defendant into a Veterans and Servicemembers Court,
the judge must order the defendant to submit to a set of mandatory screenings,
including an evaluation of the defendant’s record as a veteran or a servicemember
and a risk assessment including “recommendations for treatment of the conditions
which are indicating a need for treatment under the monitoring of the Court.”248
Prior to accepting any eligible justice-involved veteran or servicemember,
the presiding judge must inform the individual that failure to complete any
component of the program’s regimen may result in termination from the
program.249 The judge must then execute a written agreement with the justiceinvolved veteran or servicemember describing the steps of the program and the
consequences of non-compliance.250 Judges maintain the discretion to order the
veteran or servicemember to complete either or both of substance abuse treatment
or mental health counseling, and to “comply with physicians’ recommendation[s]
regarding medications and all follow up treatment.”251
242

Id.

243

Id. 167/20.

244

Id. 167/20(a).

245

Id. 167/20(b)(5).

246

Id. 167/20(b)(1), (3).

247

Id. 167/20(b)(2).

248

Id. 167/25.

249

Id. 167/25(c).

250

Id. 167/25(d).

251

Id. 167/25(e).
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Veterans and Servicemembers Courts in Illinois may, but are not required
to, include a recovery-focused veteran-to-veteran mentorship component.252 If
a court establishes a peer-to-peer mentoring program, then the court bears the
responsibility of training each volunteer mentor properly before permitting the
mentor to work one-on-one with any justice-involved veterans on the court’s
docket.253 If a justice-involved veteran or servicemember successfully completes
the entire program, then the court has discretion to dismiss the original criminal
charges fully, terminate the original sentence, or “otherwise discharge him or her
from any further proceedings against him or her in the original prosecution.”254
However, the presiding judge also maintains the authority to undertake some
other action toward the justice-involved veteran or servicemember following
graduation from the prescribed program.255

B. Michigan
Under Michigan law, a veteran must “abuse or [be] dependent upon any
controlled substance or alcohol or suffer from a mental illness” to potentially
qualify for Veterans Treatment Court services.256 Veterans Treatment Courts are
open only to individuals who received a discharge under conditions other than
dishonorable and who served on active duty for at least 180 days, making the
definition of the word “veteran” under this statute slightly more stringent than the
VA’s definition of a veteran.257
Michigan’s Veterans Treatment Court statute mandates compliance with
a modified version of the ten key drug treatment court components that
Judge Russell drafted for his court in Buffalo.258 The statute requires any
court developing a Veterans Treatment Court component to first participate
in Veterans Treatment Court-specific training approved by the state’s office of
court administration.259 It also requires the circuit court in any state judicial
circuit or the district court in any judicial district seeking to create a Veterans
Treatment Court to enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
each participating prosecuting attorney in that circuit or district, a member of the
252

Id. 167/25(f ).

Id. (“Courts shall be responsible to administer the mentorship program with the support
of volunteer veterans and local veterans service organizations . . . . Peer recovery coaches shall be
trained and certified by the Court prior to being assigned to participants in the program.”).
253

254

Id. 167/35(b).

Id. The court also maintains broad discretion regarding what actions to take toward a
justice-involved veteran who does not participate in the treatment program to the court’s satisfaction.
See id. 167/35(a).
255

256

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1200(j) (2017).

257

Compare id. § 600.1200(h) with 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012).

258

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1201(1).

259

Id. § 600.1201(3).
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criminal defense bar from that circuit or district, and at least one representative
from the VA who agrees to support the work of Veterans Treatment Courts in that
circuit or district.260
A traditional criminal court may transfer an eligible case to a Veterans
Treatment Court within the state, provided the defendant, the prosecutor, the
defense attorney, and the judges of both the transferring court and the Veterans
Treatment Court agree to this move.261 Transfer can occur at any point during
the proceedings.262 To further their work, Veterans Treatment Courts have
the authority to contract with local service providers to provide background
investigations and clinical assessments, although clinical services like drug and
alcohol treatment and mental health therapy are to be provided by the VA
whenever possible.263
Violent offenders are ineligible for admission into Michigan’s Veterans
Treatment Courts.264 A prior Veterans Treatment Court graduate may still
be eligible for admission into a Veterans Treatment Court for his or her new
offense.265 However, such a person cannot have his or her current offense fully
dismissed upon returning to the court for a second time even if he or she
successfully completes the full Veterans Treatment Court program.266 Before
admitting a justice-involved veteran to a Veterans Treatment Court, the court
must first conduct a “screening and evaluation assessment” that reviews multiple
factors, including the individual’s military record, prior criminal history,
previous drug or alcohol abuse, mental health history, and “any special needs or
circumstances . . . that may potentially affect the individual’s ability to receive
substance abuse treatment and follow the court’s orders.”267 The court must
also work with professionals in various disciplines to assess the veteran’s “risk of
danger or harm to the individual, others, or the community.”268 All information
collected for these evaluations and assessments, with the exception of findings
which demonstrate criminal conduct other than personal drug or alcohol abuse,
cannot be used against the veteran in a criminal prosecution.269
Once a Veterans Treatment Court admits a justice-involved veteran, the
court must provide the veteran a mentor who is “as similar to the individual
260

Id. § 600.1201(2).

261

Id. § 600.1201(4).

262

Id.

263

Id. § 600.1202.

264

Id. § 600.1203(1).

265

Id.

266

Id.

267

Id. § 600.1203(3)(a)–(b), (d)–(f ).

268

Id. § 600.1203(3)(c).

269

Id. § 600.1203(4).
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as possible in terms of age, gender, branch of service, military rank, and period
of military service.”270 The court shall monitor the veteran’s progress closely
and provide evaluations on a regular basis discussing the veteran’s progression
through the program.271 To encourage advancement, the Act requires the court
to institute a strategy of rewards for meeting certain objectives and sanctions—
including, where appropriate, “the possibility of incarceration or confinement”—
for justice-involved veterans who fail to meet program standards.272 The court
must also connect the veteran with necessary physical and mental health services,
educational opportunities, and vocational counseling.273 Whenever possible, these
services should be VA-based.274 The veteran must also receive assistance from a
VA-accredited Veterans Service Officer to determine whether the veteran is
eligible for any federal or state veteran-specific benefits, programs, or services.275
A veteran’s admittance to a Veterans Treatment Court in Michigan does not
exempt that veteran from paying court-ordered fines and costs, crime victims’
rights assessment fees, and any other court-ordered forms of restitution.276
Furthermore, the court must require that the justice-involved veteran
reimburse the court for any expenses linked to services the court provides to
the veteran, including all mandatory drug testing and mental health counseling
services.277 However, the statute reserves to the court the discretion to waive this
requirement in part or in total if the presiding judge determines that requiring
the justice-involved veteran to pay money “would be a substantial hardship for
the individual or would interfere with the individual’s substance abuse or mental
health treatment.”278
Michigan’s statute provides multiple options a court can pursue upon
the veteran’s graduation.279 In general, full dismissal of the criminal charges
requires agreement from the prosecutor, and is available only if the veteran is
participating in a Veterans Treatment Court for the first time.280 Full dismissal is
available only if the justice-involved veteran is “not currently charged with and
has not pled guilty to a [felony or misdemeanor] traffic offense” under the

270

Id. § 600.1207(1)(b).

271

Id. § 600.1207(d).

272

Id. § 600.1207(e).

273

Id. § 600.1207(f )–(g).

274

Id.

275

Id. § 600.1208(1)(f ).

276

Id. § 600.1208(1)(a)–(d).

277

Id. § 600.1208(3).

278

Id.

279

Id. § 600.1209.

280

Id. § 600.1209(4)(a)–(e).
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Michigan Vehicle Code.281 If a veteran fails to complete the entire Veterans
Treatment Court regimen, or is terminated from the program due to noncompliance, then the court enters an adjudication of guilt and proceeds
to sentencing.282
After each justice-involved veteran leaves a Veterans Treatment Court, the
Act requires the court to send information to the state police regarding the
veteran’s successful or unsuccessful participation in the program.283 If the veteran
successfully graduates from a Veterans Treatment Court, then the state police
must keep this record sealed from the public and exempt from disclosure under
the state’s freedom of information laws.284 Additionally, the Veterans Treatment
Court must collect data “on each individual applicant and participant and the
entire program,” and provide such data to the state’s office of court admini
stration, allowing for this agency to examine each Veterans Treatment Court’s
methods and outcomes, and based on this information, develop best practices for
Veterans Treatment Courts across the state.285

C. Texas
When Texas enacted legislation initially regarding Veterans Treatment
Courts within its borders, the law limited participation in these courts to justiceinvolved veterans who sustained an injury while serving in a combat zone or
other comparable area of “hazardous duty.”286 In 2015, however, an amendment
to this law went into effect and expanded eligibility to these courts, representing
the improved public understanding that a damaging service-connected injury
can occur in locations beyond a combat zone.287 Today, justice-involved veterans
and servicemembers who served or are presently serving in any component of
the Armed Forces, including the National Guard, State Guard, and Reserves,
may be eligible for participation in a Veterans Treatment Court if doing so
“is likely to achieve the objective of ensuring public safety through rehabilitation.”288 Veterans and servicemembers who suffer “from a brain injury, mental
illness, or mental disorder, including post-traumatic stress disorder, or [who] was
a victim of military sexual trauma” receive particularly strong consideration for
Veterans Treatment Court eligibility if the medical condition in question occurred
281

Id. § 600.1209(4)(d).

282

Id. § 600.1209(8).

283

Id. § 600.1209(6).

284

See id.

285

Id. § 600.1210; see also id. § 600.1211.

Brandon Barnett, Texas Broadens Eligibility for Veterans Treatment Courts, Barnett
Howard & Williams (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.bhwlawfirm.com/texas-broadens-eligibilityfor-veterans-treatment-courts/.
286

287

Id.

288

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 124.002(a)(2) (West 2017).
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as a result of the individual’s military service and impacted the individual’s conduct
that led to the criminal charges at issue.289
Texas’s law makes no mention of any specific discharge classifications
affecting the eligibility of a veteran’s participation in Veterans Treatment Court,
meaning that Texas’s courts will accept veterans who are ineligible for VA
benefits, programs, and services.290 A veteran must be represented by counsel
before agreeing to the terms and conditions of a Veterans Treatment Court, and
must remain represented by counsel for the duration of the veteran’s time in the
Veterans Treatment Court program.291 All Veterans Treatment Court treatment
plans must be individualized and must be provided to the justice-involved
veteran.292 Any treatment plan for a justice-involved veteran must involve a
minimum of six months of treatment and monitoring, but cannot last longer
than the allowable period of community supervision for the offense(s) charged.293
Veterans Treatment Courts may require justice-involved veterans to pay
reasonable fees of $1,000 or less for participating in the program, as well as the
costs for any court-ordered testing, counseling, and treatment.294 The presiding
judge maintains the discretion to waive these fees if the justice-involved veteran
is truly unable to pay.295 Any money collected from justice-involved veterans
in program participation fees must be “used only for purposes specific to
the program.”296
When necessary, to maximize the veteran’s chances of successful rehabili
tation, a Veterans Treatment Court that accepts a justice-involved veteran’s case
may transfer supervision of that case to another Veterans Treatment Court located
in the county where the veteran works or lives.297 Where appropriate, courts may
also approve teleconferencing or “other Internet-based communications” to meet
treatment requirements.298 Veterans Treatment Courts in Texas must adopt the
basic premises of Judge Russell’s “ten key components” for Veterans Treatment
Courts, as well as an eleventh component emphasizing involvement of the justiceinvolved veteran’s family in the treatment process when feasible.299
289

Id. § 124.002(a)(1).

See id. § 124.002(a) (listing no character of service limitations within the statute’s definition
of the term “veteran”).
290

291

Id. § 124.003(a).

292

Id. § 124.003(a)(3).

293

Id. § 124.003(a)(4).

294

Id. § 124.005(a).

295

Id. § 124.005(b)(1).

296

Id. § 124.005(b)(2).

297

See id. § 124.003(b).

298

Id. § 124.003(b-1).

299

Id. § 124.001(a).
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Texas’s Veterans Treatment Court statute does not expressly mandate the
creation of a peer-to-peer mentor program.300 In addition, this law does not
provide a list of specific criminal offenses or classifications of offenses resulting
in an absolute bar to Veterans Treatment Court eligibility.301 However, no veteran
or servicemember may enter a Veterans Treatment Court without consent from
the prosecuting attorney, as well as agreement from the defendant.302 When
a veteran or servicemember graduates from the Veterans Treatment Court
program, the Veterans Treatment Court must then hold a hearing to determine
whether dismissal of the charges “is in the best interest of justice.”303 If this
hearing results in such a determination, then the court maintaining original
jurisdiction over the criminal matter is required to dismiss the case.304

D. Maine
Maine offers a Veterans Treatment Court statute which both expressly and
implicitly leaves the bulk of the governing authority to the state’s Supreme
Judicial Court.305 It defines “veterans treatment court” as “a specialized sentencing
docket in select criminal cases in which the defendant is a veteran or member of
the United States Armed Forces to enable veterans[’] agencies and social services
agencies to provide treatment for that defendant.”306 The statute specifies that a
Veterans Treatment Court is not expected to provide treatment itself, but instead,
“contracts or collaborates with experienced and expert treatment providers.”307
This legislation calls for a collaborative approach to handling cases on a
Veterans Treatment Court’s docket, requiring partnerships among departments
and agencies including district attorneys, the State Court Administrator, the
state’s Attorney General, the state’s Department of Corrections, the state’s
Department of Emergency Management, and private community-based social
services agencies.308
Beyond that, however, Maine’s Veterans Treatment Court statute leaves all
other criteria in the hands of the Chief Justice of the state’s Supreme Judicial
Court.309 If the Chief Justice believes that any baseline criteria are necessary
300

See id. § 124.003.

Id. § 124.002 (describing eligibility requirements for Texas’ Veterans Treatment Courts
without mentioning any offenses that are absolute bars to participation in these courts).
301

302

Id. § 124.002(a).

303

Id. § 124.001(b).

304

Id.

305

See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 433 (2017).

306

Id. § 433(1).

307

Id.

308

Id. § 433(3).

309

Id. § 433(2).
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regarding management of these courts, then the Chief Justice may issue
administrative orders and court rules of practice establishing these standards.310
Yet the Chief Justice is not mandated to adopt any orders or rules if he or she
does not deem them necessary, meaning each Veterans Treatment Court in Maine
could theoretically differ dramatically from all of the other Veterans Treatment
Courts around it.311 As the judicial branch, without legislative or executive input,
forms these orders and rules, the people of Maine have very little direct impact
upon the important criminal justice policies established by Veterans Treatment
Courts within their state.312

E. Utah
Enacted in 2015, Utah’s Veterans Treatment Court statute is one of the
newest in existence.313 It authorizes the state’s Judicial Council to establish a
Veterans Treatment Court in any judicial district or geographic region of the
state, but only if that district or region first demonstrates the need for such a
court.314 Furthermore, the district or region seeking a Veterans Treatment
Court must first prove to the Judicial Council’s satisfaction that a “collaborative
strategy” already exists among the court, prosecutors, defense counsel, the
Department of Corrections, substance abuse treatment providers, and the VA’s
Veterans Justice Outreach Program to support and sustain such a court.315
All Veterans Treatment Courts in Utah require the justice-involved
veteran plead guilty to the charged offense(s) or receive some other adjudication
for one or more criminal offenses, before the veteran can enter the court’s
program.316 Once accepted into the program, the justice-involved veteran must
receive frequent alcohol and drug testing, unless the court deems such testing
inappropriate for the nature of the veteran’s criminal offense(s).317 Unlike some
of the other statutes examined earlier, Utah’s law does not specify whether the
justice-involved veteran needs to pay for this mandatory testing.318 All justiceinvolved veterans in Veterans Treatment Courts must participate in “veteran
diversion outreach programs,” including substance abuse treatment programs

310

Id. § 433(2).

311

See id.

312

See id. § 433; supra notes 94 –153 and accompanying text.

313

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301 (West 2017).

314

Id. § 78A-5-301(1)(a).

315

Id. § 78A-5-301(1)(b).

316

Id. § 78A-5-301(4)(a).

317

Id. § 78A-5-301(4)(b).

Compare id. § 78A-5-301 with Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.1200–.1211 (2017) and Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 124.001–.006 (West 2017).
318
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when warranted.319 Furthermore, all Veterans Treatment Courts in Utah must
establish punishments for failing to comply with court-ordered requirements,
although the precise nature of these sanctions appears to remain exclusively in the
hands of the individual courts.320
Veterans Treatment Courts in Utah must collect and maintain data
regarding their operations, practices, and outcomes, and report this information
to the state’s Administrative Office of the Courts.321 The Administrative Office
of the Courts must publish a report on the state’s Veterans Treatment Courts
the 1st of October.322 At minimum, this report must include the number of
justice-involved veterans participating in the state’s Veterans Treatment Courts,
the outcomes for justice-involved veterans who were involved in these court
programs, the “types of programs” among the state’s Veterans Treatment Courts,
and any recommendations for measures that could improve Utah’s Veterans
Treatment Courts in the future.323
Utah’s statute does not provide a definition of the term “veteran,” nor
does it state whether a Veterans Treatment Court may accept the case of an
individual still serving on active duty or in the National Guard or Reserves.324
While a justice-involved veteran must plead guilty to a crime before entering
Veterans Treatment Court, the law does not instruct the courts regarding
what should happen to the veteran’s criminal charges if he or she successfully
graduates from the program.325 Additionally, the law does not establish a list of
criminal offenses acting as absolute bars to Veterans Treatment Court eligibility,
another distinguishing feature when compared with some of the statutes
discussed earlier.326 Presumably, all of these matters are the sole domain of the
individual Veterans Treatment Courts themselves, and would hopefully be
resolved in the preliminary negotiations and agreements that must occur before
the state’s Judicial Council will permit a Veterans Treatment Court to exist in a
particular jurisdiction.327
319

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301(4)(c).

320

Id. § 78A-5-301(4)(d).

321

Id. § 78A-5-301(2), (5).

322

Id. § 78A-5-301(5).

323

Id.

See id. § 78A-5-301 (providing no definition of the term “veteran” for Veterans Treatment
Court participation purposes).
324

See id. § 78A-5-301(4)(d) (stating that Veterans Treatment Courts must sanction noncompliant participants, but providing no guidance about the legal impact upon a justice-involved
veteran who successfully completes the assigned treatment program).
325

326
Compare id. § 78A-5-301, with 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 167/5–167/35 (2017), and
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.1200–.1211 (2017), and Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 124.001–.006
(West 2017).
327

See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301(1)–(2).
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F. Tennessee
Like Utah, Tennessee enacted its Veterans Treatment Court statute in 2015.328
Tennessee’s law mandates that any Veterans Treatment Court established within
its borders represent a collaborative venture between the attorney general of that
district and the defense counsel representing the justice-involved veteran.329 All
Veterans Treatment Courts in Tennessee must adopt and fully adhere to the “Ten
Key Components of Veterans Treatment Courts.”330
The state’s Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services
is responsible for administering most aspects of Veterans Treatment Courts
in Tennessee.331 This includes developing measurable standards for Veterans
Treatment Courts within the state, and collecting, synthesizing, and reporting
data to quantify the success rates of individual Veterans Treatment Courts, as
well as recommending practices to follow and pitfalls to avoid.332 The Depart
ment of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (the Department) must
“sponsor and coordinate” Veterans Treatment Court trainings throughout the
state, although the Department itself does not need to design the training.333
The Department must also “support” a peer-to-peer mentoring program for
Veterans Treatment Courts, although no provisions in the Veterans Treatment
Court statute appear to mandate a mentor program in all of the state’s Veterans
Treatment Courts.334
Additionally, Tennessee’s statute authorizes the Department to administer
and award grants to Veterans Treatment Courts throughout the state.335 The
law restricts the use of grant money to six categories: funding a full-time or
part-time director, funding staff to support Veterans Treatment Court program
operations, funding medical treatment services for justice-involved veterans,
funding drug testing, funding “costs directly related to program operations,”
and “implement[ing] or continu[ing] [V]eterans [T]reatment [C]ourt program
operations.”336 Any Veterans Treatment Court in Tennessee that does not abide
by the Ten Key Components or any of the other state-mandated provisions is

328
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-6-101–106 (2017) (“Criminal Justice Veterans Compensation
Act of 2015”).
329

Id. § 16-6-101(1).

330

Id. § 16-6-103.

Id. § 16-6-104. For the remainder of this section, this article shall refer to the Tennessee
Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services as “the Department.”
331

332

Id. §§ 16-6-104(1)–(2).

333

Id. § 16-6-104(4).

334

Id. § 16-6-104(3).

335

Id. § 16-6-105.

336

See id.
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ineligible to receive any state grant funding.337 Beyond this, the Department of
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services appears to possess wide discretion
to award these grants to whatever courts they deem worthy of this funding.338
Similar to Utah’s statute, Tennessee’s law neither provides an exact definition
of the term “veteran” nor clarifies whether servicemembers presently on active
duty, National Guard duty, or Reserve status are eligible for Veterans Treatment
Courts.339 Tennessee’s statute does not explain whether justice-involved veterans
are eligible for Veterans Treatment Court programs only after entering a guilty
plea or whether pre-plea eligibility may sometimes be available.340 Tennessee’s
law also does not provide any precise guidance to Veterans Treatment Courts
regarding the legal effects of successful graduation from the court-assigned
program, including the impact upon the criminal charges that brought the
veteran into the justice system in the first place.341

G. Missouri
Missouri requires an agreement from the presiding judge of a state judicial
circuit before any judge within that circuit may establish a Veterans Treatment
Court.342 The legislature assigns each state circuit court the responsibility of
establishing rules for referring a case to a Veterans Treatment Court.343 However,
no referrals can occur within that circuit until the state circuit court enters into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each prosecuting attorney in
that circuit court.344 This MOU must include a list of offenses automatically
rendering a defendant ineligible for the Veterans Treatment Court.345 The MOU
may include participation from other parties such as defense attorneys, probation
officers, and treatment providers from the VA and from local service agencies.346
Veterans and presently serving military members, including individuals
serving in the National Guard, Reserves, and State Guard, meet the service
337

Id. § 16-6-106.

338

See id. § 16-6-105.

See id. § 16-6-101 (refraining from defining the term “veteran” within the confines of
this statute).
339

340
See id. § 16-6-104 (mentioning nothing about whether Veterans Treatment Courts in
Tennessee adopt only a post-plea model or whether pre-plea entry into Veterans Treatment Courts
may be allowable).
341
Compare id. § 16-6-104 with Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 124.001(b) (West 2017) and
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1209 (2017).
342

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(1) (2017).

343

Id. § 478.008(2)–(3).

344

Id. § 478.008(3)(2).

345

Id.

346

Id.
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eligibility standards for Missouri’s Veterans Treatment Courts.347 Missouri’s
Veterans Treatment Court statute imposes no requirements regarding a
veteran’s character of discharge, meaning veterans who are ineligible for VA
benefits, programs and services, may be eligible for a Veterans Treatment Court
program.348 Transfer from a traditional criminal court to a Veterans Treatment
Court in a different jurisdiction within the state may occur based on the
residence of the justice-involved veteran or the unavailability of a Veterans
Treatment Court in the original jurisdiction.349 This transfer may occur at any
point during the judicial proceedings.350 If the veteran fails to graduate from the
Veterans Treatment Court, then the case will return to the original court for a
final disposition.351
Veterans Treatment Courts in Missouri must refer a justice-involved veteran
to mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, or some combination
thereof, unless good cause exists not to do so.352 Such referrals can go to the VA,
to the United States Department of Defense, or to community social services
agencies.353 Community-based providers receiving referrals from Veterans
Treatment Courts must receive certification through the Missouri Department
of Mental Health.354
Statements from a Veterans Treatment Court participant, or any reports
that Veterans Treatment Court staff develop regarding a justice-involved
veteran’s progress, are inadmissible against the justice-involved veteran in any
criminal, civil, or juvenile proceeding.355 However, if a Veterans Treatment Court
terminates a justice-involved veteran’s participation in the program, then the
court of original jurisdiction may obtain the reasons for termination and use
this information when determining the sentencing or disposition of this
individual.356 If a veteran graduates from the court-assigned program, then
“the charges, petition, or penalty” against the justice-involved veteran “may be
dismissed, reduced, or modified.”357 The judiciary holds full authority to decide

347

Id. § 478.008(2).

See id. (refraining from limiting Veterans Treatment Court admissions to veterans
discharged under honorable conditions); 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
348

349

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(4).

350

Id. § 478.008(4)(2).

351

Id. § 478.008(4)(4).

352

Id. § 478.008(6).

353

Id.

354

Id.

355

Id. § 478.008(7).

356

Id.

357

Id. § 478.008(10).
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which of these options, if any, it wishes to pursue in each case.358 Notably, any
fees a justice-involved veteran pays to a court for mental health or substance abuse
treatment programs do not qualify as court costs or fees.359

H. Uniform Veterans Treatment Court Act
In November 2015, a seventeen-member committee from the Uniform
Law Commission drafted a fourteen-page document that, in the Commission’s
opinion, represented a model for states seeking to establish legislation governing
aspects of Veterans Treatment Courts.360 The model act allows Veterans Treatment
Courts to accept both veterans and servicemembers, including individuals
presently serving in the National Guard and the Reserves.361 No veteran may be
excluded from a Veterans Treatment Court under the model legislation solely on
the basis of his or her character of discharge.362 Under the model act, all Veterans
Treatment Courts must adopt and implement the Ten Key Components of
Veterans Treatment Courts.363
Veterans Treatment Courts may, in accordance with the circuit court judge’s
discretion, exist as a track within an existing Drug Treatment Court program or
as a stand-alone court.364 Any court within a given jurisdiction holds the legal
authority to establish a Veterans Treatment Court.365 If the circuit court judge
prefers, one Veterans Treatment Court can exist within a particular judicial
district, with other tribunals within that district transferring eligible justiceinvolved veterans to that particular court.366
Under the model act, justice-involved veterans may enter a Veterans
Treatment Court only if the prosecutor consents to such a move.367 The justice-

358
Id. (placing no statutory limits on the judiciary’s ability to pursue any of these options).
The criteria for this would likely appear in the MOU governing that particular Veterans Treatment
Court’s activities. See id. § 478.008(3)(2).
359

Id. § 478.008(10).

Model Veterans Court Act (Nat’l Conference
Proposed Draft 2015).
360

361

of

Comm’rs

on

Unif. State Laws,

Id. § 2(1), (4), (5).

Id. § 5(a) (“Veterans, regardless of discharge, and currently serving servicemembers are
eligible for Veterans and Servicemembers Treatment Court.”).
362

363

Id. § 2(6).

364

Id. § 4.

365

Id.

366

Id.

367

Id. § 5(a)(2).
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involved veteran must consent to this arrangement as well.368 Even if both of these
parties agree, however, the presiding judge still holds the power to reject a justiceinvolved veteran from his or her court.369 Interestingly, the model act does not
require consent from defense counsel, nor does it require that counsel represent
the justice-involved veteran at the time of consenting to Veterans Treatment
Court participation.370
The model act devotes considerable attention to factors the court and the
prosecutor may consider when evaluating whether to admit a justice-involved
veteran to a Veterans Treatment Court.371 These factors include, but are not
limited to: the nature and circumstances of the charged offense, the
defendant’s prior criminal history, the defendant’s “medical and mental history,”
the availability of resources to meet the defendant’s treatment needs, any
recommendations from the victim and from law enforcement, the likelihood
of obtaining restitution from the defendant, and any other information that
can help the court decide whether a Veterans Treatment Court is appropriate
for this particular individual.372 The model act then lists several specific
offenses that instantly render a justice-involved veteran ineligible for Veterans
Treatment Court, including various crimes of violence and offenses for which
probation is never an option.373
According to the model act, both pre-plea and post-plea frameworks are
acceptable for Veterans Treatment Courts.374 The final decision of whether to
accept a case before a plea is entered, or to require that particular justice-involved
veteran to enter a plea before the case is transferred, remains in the hands of the
presiding judge.375 Each Veterans Treatment Court must adopt a manual of written
policies and procedures, and must also enter into a written agreement with the
justice-involved veteran.376 Both the manual and the written agreement informs
the veteran about these policies—including the penalties for failing to comply
with court requirements and orders—prior to entering the Veterans Treatment
Court program.377 Statements from a justice-involved veteran during his or her
participation in a Veterans Treatment Court, or from Veterans Treatment Court
staff members about a particular justice-involved veteran, are inadmissible in any
368

Id. § 5(a)(1).

369

Id. § 5(a)(5).

370

See id. § 5.

371

See id. § 5(a).

372

Id.

373

Id. § 5(c).

374

Id. § 6(1).

375

Id. § 6(1), (4).

376

Id. § 6(4).

377

Id.
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legal proceeding against that justice-involved veteran.378 However, if the court
terminates an individual’s participation in the program, then the reasons for
termination are discoverable by the judge of original jurisdiction and can be used
as a factor when considering disposition or sentencing.379
All participants in Veterans Treatment Courts must receive an eligibility
assessment and a drug, alcohol, and mental health screening prior to the court
deciding whether to accept the case.380 These screening reports must include an
assessment of the justice-involved veteran’s risk of recidivism, as well as treatment
recommendations.381 The presiding judge holds the power to order the justiceinvolved veteran to complete mental health counseling and/or substance abuse
treatment, and comply with all physician-ordered treatment requirements.382
The model act lists several reasons why a Veterans Treatment Court may
terminate a justice-involved veteran’s participation.383 If the court ends an
individual’s participation, the court may reinstate the original criminal proceedings
against the defendant.384 In addition, Veterans Treatment Courts retain the
authority to order a justice-involved veteran to pay part or all the costs of the
court-ordered treatment regimen.385 If the justice-involved veteran lacks adequate
funds to pay for these costs, then the presiding judge should make every effort
to “arrange for the probationer to be assigned to a treatment program funded by
the State or federal government.”386 Furthermore, the presiding judge may order
the justice-involved veteran to complete reasonable community service activities
in lieu of a financial payment to cover the costs of his or her treatment.387 If
circumstances merit a full waiver of the costs involved, then the presiding judge
also has the power to make such an order.388
Each individual court possesses the authority, under the model act, to
develop its own baseline written “criteria that define successful completion of the

378

Id. § 6(5).

379

Id.

380

Id. § 7.

381

Id. § 7(a).

382

Id. § 7(c), (f ).

383

Id. § 8.

384

Id. § 8(b)(4).

385

Id. § 9.

386

Id. § 9(a)(1).

387

Id. § 9(a)(2).

388

Id. § 9(b).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss1/3

48

Pomerance: The Best-Fitting Uniform: Balancing Legislative Standards and Jud

2018

The Best-Fitting Uniform

227

program.”389 If a justice-involved veteran graduates from the Veterans Treatment
Court program, then the prosecuting attorney may—but is not required to—
dismiss the criminal charges against this individual.390 If the justice-involved
veteran entered a Veterans Treatment Court as a condition of the original court’s
sentence, then the original court may reduce or modify the severity of the
sentence after graduation from the Veterans Treatment Court.391
Surprisingly absent from the model act are any criteria regarding peer-topeer mentor program in the hypothetical state’s Veterans Treatment Courts.392
In addition, the model act does not appear to enact any data collection or
reporting requirements upon the courts.393 Given the tremendous need
for reliably collected and thoroughly analyzed data regarding the practices,
strategies, and outcomes of Veterans Treatment Courts, such an obligation would
be widely welcomed.394

VI. Proposing a Balance: Legislating Standards
that Respect Judicial Autonomy
The final component of this article offers recommendations for states
drafting or revising Veterans Treatment Court statutes.395 In developing a list
of categories that the popularly elected branches should standardize, this part
takes into consideration the existing Veterans Treatment Court laws explored in
the preceding section, as well as the previous discussions regarding separation of
powers principles in the governance of the United States.396
Again, the objective here is not to evaluate precisely how states should
structure these criteria.397 Instead, this proposition considers only what types
of decisions regarding Veterans Treatment Courts should come from the
legislative and executive branches, and what groups of issues should remain topics
over which the judicial branch maintains autonomy.398 This framework may not
suggest a perfect structure for every jurisdiction, and plenty of states may indeed

389

Id. § 6(4).

390

Id. § 6(2).

391

Id.

392

See id. § 6.

Compare Model Veterans Court Act with Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301(2) (West
2017) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1210 (2017).
393

394

See supra notes 80– 83 and accompanying text.

395

See infra notes 396–455 and accompanying text.

396

See supra notes 94–230 and accompanying text.

397

See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.

398

See infra notes 401–55 and accompanying text.
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take issue with some of the categories outlined below.399 However, it serves the
ultimate purpose of this article’s discussion: demonstrating that a sensible balance
between democratically established uniformity and judicial discretion can and
should exist in the Veterans Treatment Court context.400

A. Threshold Matters
A Veterans Treatment Court statute should logically begin with the
definition of precisely whom such a court should seek to assist. Individualized
case-by-case determinations of whether to accept or deny a particular justiceinvolved veteran should remain the ultimate domain of the judiciary.401
Weighing the various facts and circumstances involved in a particular matter, and
rendering a judgment about whether a particular case merits the intervention of
a problem-solving court, is a traditional function of the judiciary.402 In a Veterans
Treatment Court, one would reasonably expect that the presiding judge would
rely heavily upon the evaluations of the experts who form the treatment team
before issuing a decision about whether to admit or deny the case at hand.
However, certain threshold policy matters—particularly those with direct
financial implications or fundamental ethical judgments upon the counties where
these courts reside—warrant the participation of citizens through their popularly
elected representatives.403 For instance, a Veterans Treatment Court statute
should provide a definition of the word “veteran” that applies to all Veterans
Treatment Courts in the state. As discussed previously, defining this seemingly
simple term is quite consequential.404 Mirroring the VA’s definition, for instance,
will automatically ban any individual with a less-than-honorable discharge from
participating in a Veterans Treatment Court.405 Some might argue that doing
so excludes far too many people from obtaining the potentially life-changing
intervention and treatment these courts provide.406 On the other hand, localities
399
As already noted, each jurisdiction presents unique facts and circumstances that require
unique administrative policies. See, e.g., supra notes 233–94 and accompanying text (discussing
variations in legal standards of Veterans Treatment Courts among several states).
400

See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 165– 69 and accompanying text. One would also expect that the judge
would make this decision in consultation with the district attorney and the justice-involved veteran’s
defense counsel, but that the final authority of deciding whether to permit a case to enter Veterans
Treatment Court would reside in the hands of that court’s presiding judge. See supra notes 75–78
and accompanying text.
401

402

See supra 94–153 and accompanying text.

403

See supra notes 108–53 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 154–231 and
accompanying text (illustrating the consequences of differing definitions of the word “veteran” in
various state statutes).
404

405

See supra notes 63, 171–73 and accompanying text.

406

Moga, supra note 44.
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may bear additional treatment costs—an expense ultimately passed on to the
men and women who live in these communities—if a Veterans Treatment
Court accepts justice-involved veterans who are ineligible for VA services.407
Considering the direct impact of the construction of such a definition upon the
people themselves, this is a decision the legislative and executive branches should
rightfully make and apply uniformly across all of the Veterans Treatment Courts
in the state.408
A Veterans Treatment Court statute should determine whether the state’s
Veterans Treatment Courts are open to individuals presently serving as well as
to veterans, and decide whether members of the National Guard or the Reserves
warrant “veteran” or “servicemember” status in this context.409 Determining how
and when veterans are identified in the criminal justice system is another area
meriting consistent statewide application.410 Lawmakers also need to establish
whether the Veterans Treatment Courts of that state will demand a nexus between
a service-connected disability and the charged offense before permitting a
justice-involved veteran’s case to proceed into that court.411 Once again, these are
fundamental criminal justice policy issues directly impacting the pocketbooks and
ethical compasses of citizens, and a goal of consistently applied justice demands
that these essential matters remain uniform throughout all of the state’s Veterans
Treatment Courts.412
Similarly, the people’s elected representatives need to decide whether
certain types of criminal offenses are so egregious that the doors of all Veterans
Treatment Courts must remain locked to any individual charged with these
crimes. These decisions should come from the citizens, just as citizen decided
mandatory minimum sentences are imposed upon conviction of certain
proscribed conduct.413 While the court’s presiding judge may ultimately decide
that a criminal offense not included on the statutory list is too severe to allow
the case into a Veterans Treatment Court, the people have the right to provide
407

See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 723; Cartwright, supra note 6, at 306.

See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see generally supra notes 154–231 and
accompanying text.
408

Many, but not all, of the state statutes examined in this article provide such a definition. See
supra notes 154–230 and accompanying text.
409

U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, Breaking the Cycle
Incarceration and Homelessness: Emerging Community Practices, at 2 (2015).
410

of

Veteran

Everett, supra note 65; Jones, supra note 6, at 309 (discussing the policy objectives at issue
for courts and for members of the public regarding this decision).
411

412
Arno, supra note 6, at 1060 (discussing the desirability of greater consistency among a
state’s Veterans Treatment Courts in areas that directly impact matters of public policy, including
the major categorical questions of who can enter a Veterans Treatment Court and what parties in
the justice system are tasked with making this decision); Shah, supra note 7, at 105. See supra notes
169–78 and accompanying text.
413

See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
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the courts with a basic set of offenses, through their consensus-based input,
that Veterans Treatment Courts shall never hear.414 By the same token, the
legislative and executive branches should also include more generalized statutory
language about the court’s overall mission, guiding the state’s Veterans Treatment
Courts toward the broad varieties of cases that they should accept.415 However,
a Veterans Treatment Court statute should never mandate that these courts
accept a certain category of criminal offense automatically.416
Veterans Treatment Court statutes should also clearly designate the
gatekeeper(s) of the court’s docket.417 The people should decide whether they
want the district attorney’s office to have absolute veto authority over potentially
eligible cases, or whether the presiding judge possesses the final word after
consultations with the prosecution and defense counsel, or whether some
other arrangement is desirable.418 Some statutes require a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) on this matter between the judge, the district attorney, the
defense bar, and other relevant parties.419 Potentially, a state could require that the
defendant be represented by counsel at the time of agreeing to enter the Veterans
Treatment Court, a demand noted above in the Texas statute.420 Regardless of the
method, this touchstone policy matter does not fit any of the areas in which the
courts traditionally hold autonomy.421 Instead, the decision in this area deserves to
come from the people who will be affected by this elemental choice.
Finally, a Veterans Treatment Court statute should discuss which evaluations, screenings, and risk assessments defendants should undergo before a
Veterans Treatment Court decides whether to accept or reject each case.422
See supra notes 154 –231 and accompanying text (demonstrating that democratic
participation is necessary in decisions that have such a direct impact upon public life). For examples
of some statutes that provide such lists, see supra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.
414

See supra notes 176–78 and accompanying text (discussing public participation in
formulating baseline eligibility requirements for Veterans Treatment Courts). For examples of such
language in existing state statutes, see supra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.
415

See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 131, at 1017– 20; Kelman, supra note 134, at 305 (noting
the problems that arise from laws that prevent presiding judges from employing any discretion in
individual cases).
416

417

See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.

418

See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1201(2) (2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(3)(2)
(2017); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301(1)(b) (West 2017) (requiring a “collaborative
strategy” between the court, the district attorney’s office, and other key players in the justice system
before a new Veterans Treatment Court can form within the state).
419

420

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 124.002(a); 124.003(a) (West 2017).

421

See supra notes 17–92 and accompanying text.

See Baldwin, supra note 40, at 726 (discussing the variety in screening mechanisms among
multiple surveyed Veterans Treatment Courts); see also Arno, supra note 6, at 1041 (stating that
Veterans Treatment Courts would benefit from standardized best practices in this area).
422
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Standardizing this procedure guards against arbitrary acceptances and capricious
denials, protecting both the justice-involved veteran and the court system
overall.423 While the judicial branch should still possess the final authority to
accept or reject a case, mandating these scientifically administered screenings
and assessments provides the Veterans Treatment Court with a body of largely
objective evidence to consider when making its decision.424 A court may certainly
request additional tests reasonably related to making this determination beyond
those tests legally mandated, but a baseline set of examinations that all Veterans
Treatment Courts within the state require ensures a particular level of scrutiny
before letting a justice-involved veteran enter this program.425

B. Court Processes
After a Veterans Treatment Court accepts an eligible individual, a Veterans
Treatment Court statute needs to outline both the justice-involved veteran’s
obligations to the court and the court’s obligations to the justice-involved veteran.426
A Veterans Treatment Court statute should institute reasonable standards in
ethics and competence for all persons involved with these programs.427 This
should include, but not be limited to, a discussion of training requirements for
all justice system personnel involved with these cases.428 While the law does not
need to contain specific provisions detailing every aspect of this training, it should
provide an overview of areas that the training needs to cover, as well as ensure
that the trainers possess the necessary expertise to convey these insights and skills
to court personnel.429 These legal requirements are akin to statutes requiring

See Perlin, supra note 6, at 470; Shah, supra note 7, at 81 (discussing the necessity of
consistency within this area from court to court within a state).
423

A number of states have already reached this realization. See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat.
167/25 (2017); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1203(3); see also Baldwin, supra note 45, at 726, 749
(describing various screening mechanisms that the surveyed Veterans Treatment Courts utilize).
424

See Arno, supra note 6, at 1060–61 (describing the need to standardize assessment strate
gies among Veterans Treatment Courts).
425

See Shah, supra note 7, at 101– 02. Some jurisdictions have already recognized this need
and included this requirement in their Veterans Treatment Court statutes. See supra notes 233–394
and accompanying text.
426

See id. (describing the need for standardizing the parties involved in a Veterans Treatment Court and the level of expertise that these parties are expected to hold). This is another area
in which legislative power to regulate the courts is well-established. See supra notes 94–152 and
accompanying text.
427

428
See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois’ requirement that if a
Veterans Treatment Court is establishing a peer mentorship program, the court is responsible for
training the mentors); supra note 259 and accompanying text (explaining that before establishing a
Veterans Treatment Court, Michigan’s statutes require the court to undergo state approved training);
supra note 333 and accompanying text (stating that Tennessee requires the Department of Mental
Health and Substance abuse services to coordinate trainings for Veterans Treatment Courts).
429

See supra notes 252–53, 259, 333 and accompanying text.
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financial disclosures and imposing other safeguards that prevent judges from
entering compromising or damaging situations.430 As such measures preserve the
public’s faith in the judiciary, a matter that is particularly important with a novel
judicial concept such as a Veterans Treatment Court, courts traditionally uphold
statutes of this nature as a classic function of the “lawmaking branches.”431
Veterans Treatment Court laws also need to contain explicit language
regarding whether any overriding principles or concepts need to govern all of the
court’s interactions with a justice-involved veteran.432 For instance, if the people,
speaking through the voices of their elected representatives, decide that the Ten
Key Components of Veterans Treatment Courts encompass overriding goals that
they want each Veterans Treatment Court to achieve, then the state’s Veterans
Treatment Court statute should encompass these ten precepts.433 The same holds
true for other canons by which all Veterans Treatment Courts need to abide.434 In
structuring these objectives, however, lawmakers need to ensure the language does
not become overly restrictive to the courts, but instead paints these high-level
purposes with a broad brush.435
Veterans Treatment Court statutes need to discuss the basic composition
and objectives of the treatment team.436 Although these laws should leave plenty
of latitude for the court to adjust the team’s composition to adapt to certain
situations, the statute should establish the permanent members without whom
the court cannot properly execute its mission.437 For example, if the people’s
representatives determine the court should utilize the VA’s services whenever
possible, then the law should insist that a Veterans Justice Outreach Officer, or

430

See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.

431

See supra notes 125–29, 141 and accompanying text.

432

See infra notes 433–35 and accompanying text.

See Shah, supra note 7, at 67– 68, 70, 80–81 (describing the need for greater democratic
legitimacy surrounding Veterans Treatment Courts, including the inclusion of basic principles that
the people want to apply to all Veterans Treatment Courts in a state). See Ten Key Components, supra
note 184. While there seems to be little, if any, evidence-based research stating that all Veterans
Treatment Courts should adopt all of these principles, several states have incorporated the Ten
Key Components into their Veterans Treatment Court statutes. See, e.g., Model Veterans Court
Act § 2(6) (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Proposed Draft 2015); 730 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 167/10 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-6-103 (2017).
433

See Shah, supra note 7, at 67–68, 70, 80 – 81. See, e.g., Mich. Comp Laws § 1201(1)
(2017); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 124.001(a) (West 2017).
434

Shah, supra note 7, at 100 (“While legislation may provide consistency, it should not be so
limiting as to remove the effectiveness of a [Veterans Treatment Court].”).
435

436

See infra notes 437– 40 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 167/10; Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1208; Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-5-301(1)(b) (West 2017).
437
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other VA representative, play an integral role on the treatment team.438 If the
people determine that achieving sobriety is a necessary outcome of the treatment
process, then lawmakers should include alcohol and substance abuse experts as
mandatory team members.439 Moreover, if the overall public consensus agrees
with the notion that peer-to-peer mentors play an essential role in rehabilitating
justice-involved veterans, then legislators and executive branch leaders need to
codify a requirement that each Veterans Treatment Court institute a mentor
program, with each mentor properly trained and supervised in a manner
maximizing the justice-involved veteran’s chances for success.440

C. Post-Court Outcomes
Veterans Treatment Court statutes need to reflect the public’s judgments
about what should happen to a justice-involved veteran when his or her time in
the treatment program ends.441 If a veteran voluntarily drops out of the program,
or if the Veterans Treatment Court team terminates the veteran’s participation
due to non-compliance, a Veterans Treatment Court statute should provide basic
guidance regarding an appropriate judicial response.442 For example, the law
should specify whether the Veterans Treatment Court judge can hand down an
appropriate sentence or disposition, the case needs to return to the original criminal
court for a final outcome, or some other process is proper.443 Concurrently, the
statute should clarify whether the judge may utilize any statements or reports
from the veteran’s time in the Veterans Treatment Court when deciding what
sentence or disposition is appropriate.444

438
Shah, supra note 7, at 101– 02. For a reminder of the important role that Veterans Justice
Outreach specialists and other VA representatives can play on a treatment team, see supra notes
58–60 and accompanying text.
439
See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 739 (noting that 6.1% of the Veterans Treatment Courts
who responded to this survey specifically listed “Overcome Drug Dependence” as one of the court’s
primary objectives); id. at 743 (stating that 8.8% of the responding courts require random drug
testing and drug and alcohol monitoring as one of the court’s participation requirements).

Id. at 746 (stating that nearly three-quarters of the Veterans Treatment Courts responding to
this survey offer a peer-to-peer mentor program); see also supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
440

See supra notes 146–49 (analyzing the historic preservation of democratic participation in
forming judicial policies with such wide-ranging public impacts). The question of what happens
to unsuccessful participants in a Veterans Treatment Court is another matter that directly impacts
the public in terms of public safety, finances, and ethics. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 6, at 309–10,
327– 28. Such a judgment requires the input of members of the public speaking through their
elected representatives. See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text.
441

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1209(6); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(7) (2017); see supra
notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
442

443

See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.

444

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1209(6); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(7).
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The same concept holds true for veterans who successfully complete the
Veterans Treatment Court’s requirements.445 A Veterans Treatment Court statute
must be in accord with the consensus of the public about what outcomes are
proper for an individual who graduates from this program.446 The law must
state whether full dismissal of all charges is possible, and, if so, under what
circumstances.447 It must likewise define any situations where the court may still
impose a disposition of guilt or a sentence of some level upon a veteran who
graduates from Veterans Treatment Court.448 Additionally, the legislation should
specify whether the Veterans Treatment Court holds any authority to order a
justice-involved veteran to pay court fees or treatment costs, even if that veteran
successfully completes the court-assigned program.449 This decision represents the
public’s opinions about who should bear the financial burdens of maintaining a
Veterans Treatment Court and providing treatment to justice-involved veterans.450
However, lawmakers should permit Veterans Treatment Court judges enough
discretion to waive all or part of the required fees, or to establish an alternative
means of paying off this debt, if the judge determines that imposing the entire
cost will hinder the justice-involved veteran’s rehabilitation.451
Lastly, a Veterans Treatment Court statute should establish requirements
and methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data.452 As noted
earlier, reliable empirical data regarding Veterans Treatment Courts remains
surprisingly scarce.453 Specifically, if the people’s representatives determine it
would be in the public’s best interest to obtain data about the successes and
failures of these courts, then the state’s Veterans Treatment Court law should
445

See infra notes 446–51 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 94–152 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional necessity for
members of the public to have an impact upon policy decisions of this nature).
446

See Baldwin, supra note 45, at 745 (discussing various options that Veterans Treatment Courts may offer to a justice-involved veteran who successfully graduates from the
treatment program).
447

See id. The legislature may decide to grant significant discretion to the individual courts
in this area. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 478.008(3)(2) (affording the presiding judge wide latitude
to dismiss a justice-involved veteran’s charge, reduce or modify the veteran’s sentence on a case-bycase basis).
448

449

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1208; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 124.005 (West 2017).

See supra note 449 and accompanying text (demonstrating two different statutory
approaches to collecting fees from Veterans Treatment Court participants).
450

This is another way to build inter-branch balance into a Veterans Treatment Court
statute, allowing these laws to avoid the type of rigidity that prevent the judiciary from having
enough flexibility to administer these courts properly. Courts traditionally hold a significant level
of discretion in decisions to waive certain requirements regarding fines, restitution, court fees, and
other monetary matters when the party in question truly is unable to pay such costs. See supra notes
94–152 and accompanying text.
451

452

See infra notes 453–55 and accompanying text.

453

See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
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reflect this need to obtain reliable empirical data.454 As this information will assist
Veterans Treatment Court leaders to develop best practices and become more
productive—and will provide transparency into the actual effectiveness of these
courts—it is fitting for the state’s lawmakers to provide and implement such
a requirement.455

VII. Conclusion
Veterans Treatment Courts across the United States stand at a crossroads,
immersed in the broader national debate regarding governmental separation of
powers.456 While many states defer all matters pertaining to Veterans Treatment
Court administration solely to the judiciary, this article demonstrated that a
balanced inter-branch approach to managing these unique courts is not only
plausible, but essential and appropriate.457 Judges must maintain significant
discretion to properly manage their courtrooms and exercise independence in
their decision-making, but a substantial level of democratic accountability
remains necessary to maintain the constantly tense give-and-take of checks and
balances the Framers intended.458
This article discussed the historic give-and-take between the judicial, the
legislative, and executive branches. This evaluation included an analysis of the
distinctions between areas in which the judicial branch traditionally maintains
broad autonomy, such as rendering judgments in cases and controlling
“housekeeping” matters regarding court facilities and personnel, and topics on
which the people’s elected representatives in government commonly play a crucial
role, including policy matters such as establishing rules of evidence, standards
of civil procedure, and minimum sentencing thresholds.459 From there, this
article demonstrated that certain aspects of Veterans Treatment Courts fall into
categories in which the legislative and executive branches typically play a
policymaking role, ensuring that the people’s viewpoints regarding these issues are
reflected through standards that apply equally to all Veterans Treatment Courts
within a given state.460
At present, some states have established statutes governing various aspects
of their Veterans Treatment Courts, striking their own balances among the

454

See Adams et al., supra note 80; Herman, supra note 82; Jones, supra note 6, at 314.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.1210 (2017); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-301(2)
(West 2017).
455

456

See supra notes 1–92, 154–230 and accompanying text.

457

See supra notes 94–230 and accompanying text.

458

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

459

See supra notes 94 –152 and accompanying text.

460

See supra notes 154 –230 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2018

57

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 18 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

236

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 18

three branches in their governments.461 This article offered a proposed framework
for future Veterans Treatment Court statutes.462 In doing so, this article offered
a balance between policy areas in which the public’s voice needs to be heard and
topics about which the Veterans Treatment Courts themselves logically deserve to
retain considerable autonomy.463
States will undoubtedly differ in the content of their Veterans Treatment
Court statutes, with lawmakers developing language based upon value
judgments and choices from the people themselves.464 Yet the objective of this
article is not to determine what these outcomes should be, but rather simply to
ensure that states provide the people the opportunity to make these decisions.465
Doing so will not, as some people fear, unduly intrude upon the rightful
independence of the judiciary.466 Instead, states that involve all three branches
of government in the administration of Veterans Treatment Courts and establish
an appropriate balance of powers among them will enhance the likelihood that
these courts will succeed.467 By reaching this balance, these jurisdictions will
sustain the work of their Veterans Treatment Courts amid a framework
constructed from some of the most important principles upon which this nation
was built.468

461

See supra notes 232–394 and accompanying text.

462

See supra notes 395– 455 and accompanying text.

463

See supra notes 395– 455 and accompanying text.

464

See supra notes 232–294 and accompanying text.

465

See supra notes 1–16 and accompanying text.

466

See supra notes 154–230 and accompanying text.

467

See supra notes 154 – 455 and accompanying text.

468

See supra notes 154 w– 455 and accompanying text.
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